Does the U.S. Need a Military Outpost
in the Middle East?

DREW MIDDLETON / NY Times 27dec79

The Defense Department has begun to search for his site for a United States military base in the Middle East. Such a base would be used by elements of the Rapid Deployment Force and by naval and air units in the area. It would serve in an emergency as a staging area for American intervention and protection of American interests, particularly his security of the oil fields and the oil shipping lanes out of the Persian Gulf.

The establishment of a base and that troubled area has provoked a brisk debate, despite the national concern over the hostage crisis in Iran and Washington's disquiet over destabilizing elements and some of the friendly oil-producing nations in the Arabian Peninsula.

The basic issue of whether a base should be established is complicated by questions about its military effectiveness and the political prudence of the project. Is this some ask an example of Pentagon overkill? Will not money spent on building the base be wasted instability returns to the area? In that event, would not a modest base now available in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, which is capable of accommodating to destroyers and a commanding ship, suffice for American security purposes?

Some opponents are inspired by the mood that developed in the United States after the Vietnam War, when it was argued that military bases abroad usually insured American intervention. Others are concerned about the usefulness of the proposed base and conditions of guerrilla war. It might require, they argue, more men and supplies to maintain the base's security and would be militarily economic.

The administration's recognition that the increasingly turbulent situation in the Persian Gulf could require a American military action, and the consequent emphasis on the buildup of the Rapid Deployment Force, made to search for a base almost an editable.

Between 1945 and 1965 United States established or had access to more than 100 bases around the world in pursuit of its strategy of containing the Soviet Union. Many of these bases have been abandoned or be activated. Others, because of political considerations, cannot be used for operations in the Middle East.

The Persian Gulf, now the focus of military anxiety, was one area in which successive Administrations Considered That Bases Would Not Be Required.

When early in this decade Britain began to dismantle its military presence in the area, another policeman appeared on the beat, and the Iran of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi. Large and theoretically well-trained ground, sea. and air forces and constant and profitable transfers of American and British aircraft, ships, tanks and missiles were expected to transfer Iran into the foremost military power in the region. The fall of Shah and the subsequent dissolution of his Armed Forces retired that policeman.

During their reigning crisis the United States, and some cost to the credibility of the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, has assembled 22 ships in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean outside the Persian Gulf.

The two carrier battle groups, centered on the Midway and Kitty Hawk, are attended by a maintenance ship and oilers. These are necessary because the nearest base is the relatively small one at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago of the Indian Ocean, about 2500 miles southeast of the Persian Gulf.

There are NATO bases open to the United States increased, Italy and Turkey. But these are not only distant from the Gulf area, their employment by forces destined for operations in the Gulf region would be opposed by the nations involved on political, economic and religious grounds.

Military planners agree that it would be possible to land and adequate Force and the Gulf region in well under a weakened. But this Force would come from the United States and all its follow-up equipment would have to be flown in from the United States. In addition, base camps would have to be built and made secure and extra landing strips constructed.

The establishment of a base and the region would eliminate some of these difficulties.

Weapons, ammunition, equipment, food, fuel and water could be stocked in the base for the rapid replenishment of operational forces. In addition, the base would include facilities for communications with the forces involved. In times of comparative stability it would serve as the home of American ships and aircraft. Base facilities would include shops for the maintenance of the ships and planes.

Consequently, advocates of the base contend, the stability of the area would improve, the cost of maintaining a military presence halfway around the world would be amortized and American political influence on the local governments would be enhanced.

Military planners emphasize that a base should not be considered a temporary expedient. As long as the United States remains dependent for a large share of its energy supplies on Gulf oil, this country will have an interest in maintaining peace in the area whatever the base may cost, it is argued, the long-term savings would be greater.

With array and out of the picture, 5 bases are under construction. The first, the British-built complex at Mersa Matru in Western Egypt, is considered to distant.

To possible sites are in Oman, one on Masira Island, off the coast. Until recently the British Royal Air Force maintained a base there and it remains in good repair. The second site is the port of Matrah, outside the Persian Gulf. In the early '70's Soviet Union established an important air and sea base at Berbera, and Somalia. Now that the two countries have fallen out, the base is unused. Further south, on the Kenyan coast, is Mombasa.

The governments of the Gulf region, although they desire and American presence to balance the potential Soviet threat to his security, cannot want United States forces on their soil. Arab rulers argue that any United States presence would be an editable 8 lead to clashes between the Americans and the local population that would be exploited by Soviet agitators and, propagandists.

Some Americans sensitive to the delicate balance of Soviet-American relations argue that the establishment of a base would upset that balance and provoked the Soviet Union to extend its influence, possibly by military means, and Afghanistan and Iran.

Others argue that the base would inevitably involve the United States in the tangled politics of the region and that the result would be American involvement in support of Royal, right-wing governments with which this country has little in common.

A military argument is that there is no real need for the base and that the frequent visits by powerful naval forces could prove sufficient to protect American interests.

A political argument is that the base, far from insuring stability in the long run, would have a destabilizing effect on the area. Any Arab suspicion of even covert Israeli assistance to the Americans would inflame the Arab world.

Although criticism of the base program is likely to continue, the trend of military thinking in the White House and the Pentagon is that the base is necessary for the protection of American interests, which means the security of the oil fields and oil shipping routes.

Somewhat belatedly, and the view of European experts, the Carter administration has discovered both the importance of the region and the dangers of its political instability with NATO's military operations constrained by a shortage of resources, United States is the only Western nation with the resources to build and maintain a base. Unless the situation in the region unexpectedly and proves the probability is that a base will be found, the site surveyed and construction begun in the new year.

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