Court's Decision Bolsters Powers Of Police in Conducting Searches
ROBERT S. GREENBERGER / WALL STREET JOURNAL 21feb01
WASHINGTON -- Strengthening police powers to conduct searches, the Supreme Court ruled that officers may, under certain circumstances, restrain suspects from entering their own homes until a search warrant is obtained.
Writing for the majority in the 8-1 decision, Justice Stephen Breyer said the court weighed an Illinois man's right to privacy against law-enforcement needs and, in this instance, found that the police didn't violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures."
The court also heard oral arguments Tuesday in a similar case pitting privacy rights against cutting-edge search technology. In this instance, police used a heat-sensing device to, in effect, peek into the home of an Oregon man who was growing marijuana using electric lighting that generated lots of heat. The man's attorney argued that the heat-sensing technology violated the sanctity of his client's home. But Justice Antonin Scalia said people should be aware that such devices exist. "Why do we have to assume that we live in a world without technology?"
The case that produced Tuesday's decision began on April 2, 1997, in Sullivan, Ill., when Tera McArthur asked two police officers to accompany her home to her trailer to "keep the peace while she removed her belongings." When Ms. McArthur left the dwelling, she told the officers that her husband, Charles, had marijuana and drug paraphernalia hidden under a couch inside.
Mr. McArthur refused to let the officers enter the trailer to conduct a search. He was then barred from re-entering the dwelling by one officer, while the other officer sought a search warrant. The officers subsequently found the drugs and paraphernalia and arrested Mr. McArthur. A trial court granted Mr. McArthur's motion to have the evidence suppressed, and the Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed that ruling.
In Tuesday's decision, which reversed those rulings, Justice Breyer wrote, "We have found no case in which this court has held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence" while the police sought a warrant.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, saying that the possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal use was "a poor vehicle for probing the boundaries" of a person's privacy rights in his home while a search warrant is being obtained. (Illinois v. McArthur)
In other actions:
-
The high court agreed to review whether seeds and the plants that spring from them can be patented.
In 1985, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office began issuing utility patents on seeds, encouraging companies such as DuPont Co. and Monsanto Co., a unit of Pharmacia Corp., to spend billions of dollars to transplant foreign genes into crops, since those modifications could be protected from imitators.
The legality of the thousands of seed patents issued in recent years is coming to a head now because DuPont's agricultural unit, Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc., of Des Moines, Iowa, sued a Belmond, Iowa, farm-supply dealership in 1998 for selling some of its patented corn seed without permission. Tuesday, the justices agreed to review a lower-court ruling that sided with DuPont. (J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred)
-
The court ruled unanimously that agricultural cooperative banks created by the Farm Credit Act of 1933 are required to pay state income taxes. The decision overruled Missouri's Supreme Court, which had said that the federally chartered, privately owned banks were exempt from state income-tax laws. The U.S. Supreme Court said that such banks may have implied immunity if the law is silent, but in this case Congress specifically stated that such banks are subject to state taxes. (Missouri v. CoBank)
-
The justices refused an appeal by Time Warner Entertainment Co., which challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act that limits the number of subscribers a cable-television company may reach through cable systems that it owns. The company now is part of AOL Time Warner Inc. (Time Warner v. FCC)
-
The high court also rejected an appeal from CSU LLC, an Overland Park, Kan., company that began servicing Xerox photocopiers and printers in 1984. The company claimed that Xerox Corp. refused to sell replacement parts and diagnostic software in an effort to monopolize the copier-service market. (CSU v. Xerox)
Supreme
Court of the United States
ILLINOIS, Petitioner,
v. Charles McARTHUR. No. 99-1132. Argued Nov. 1, 2000. Decided Feb. 20,
2001.
Defendant
was charged with unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia and less than 2.5
grams of marijuana. The Circuit Court, Moultrie County, Arthur F. Powers, Jr.,
J., granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence found at his residence
during execution of valid search warrant. State appealed. The Appellate Court,
Cook, J., 304 Ill.App.3d 395, 238 Ill.Dec. 847, 713 N.E.2d 93, affirmed, and the
Illinois Supreme Court denied State's petition for leave to appeal, 185 Ill.2d
651, 242 Ill.Dec. 146, 720 N.E.2d 1101. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court, Justice Breyer, held that police officer's refusal to
allow defendant to enter residence without a police officer until a search
warrant was obtained was a "reasonable seizure" that did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Souter filed concurring opinion.
Justice Stevens filed dissenting opinion.
[1]
349 Searches and Seizures
349I In General
349k23 k. Fourth
Amendment and Reasonableness in General.
Fourth Amendment's central requirement is one of reasonableness. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
[2]
35 Arrest
35II On Criminal Charges
35k63.5
Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Frisk
35k63.5(9)
k. Duration of Detention and Extent or Conduct of
Investigation or Frisk.
In determining whether police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by refusing
to allow defendant, whose wife informed police that he had illegal drugs, to
enter his residence without an officer until search warrant for residence was
obtained, balancing of privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns was
appropriate rather than application of per se rule of unreasonableness; exigent
circumstances justified keeping defendant out of residence, and restraint was
limited in time and scope. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[3]
35 Arrest
35II On Criminal Charges
35k63.5
Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Frisk
35k63.5(9)
k. Duration of Detention and Extent or Conduct of
Investigation or Frisk.
35 Arrest
35II On Criminal Charges
35k68 Mode of
Making Arrest
35k68(4)
k. What Constitutes Seizure.
Police officer's refusal to allow defendant to enter residence without a police
officer until a search warrant of residence was obtained, following statement by
defendant's wife that husband had illegal drugs in residence, was a
"reasonable seizure" that did not violate the Fourth Amendment;
officer had probable cause to believe defendant had illegal drugs in residence
and reason to fear destruction of evidence, and restriction was limited in time
and scope. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[4]
35 Arrest
35II On Criminal Charges
35k63.5
Investigatory Stop or Stop-And-Frisk
35k63.5(9)
k. Duration of Detention and Extent or Conduct of
Investigation or Frisk.
Fact that defendant was standing on porch of his residence when police refused
to allow him inside residence until search warrant for illegal drugs was
obtained did not amount to "constructive eviction" in violation of
Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
|
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499. |
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *1 (U.S.)) |
Police officers, with
probable cause to believe that respondent McArthur had hidden marijuana in his
home, prevented him from entering the home unaccompanied by an officer for about
two hours while they obtained a search warrant. Once they did so, the officers
found drug paraphernalia and marijuana, and arrested McArthur. He was
subsequently charged with misdemeanor possession of those items. He moved to
suppress the evidence on the ground that it was the "fruit" of an
unlawful police seizure, namely, the refusal to let him reenter his home
unaccompanied. The Illinois trial court granted the motion, and the State
Appellate Court affirmed.
Held: Given the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at
stake, the brief seizure of the premises was permissible under the Fourth
Amendment. Pp. 3-10.
(a) The Amendment's central requirement is one of reasonableness. Although, in
the ordinary case, personal property seizures are unreasonable unless
accomplished pursuant to a warrant, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701,
103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110, there are exceptions to this rule involving
special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal
intrusions, and the like, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938,
940-941, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031. The circumstances here involve a
plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need. Cf.,
e.g., United States v. Place, supra, at 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637. Moreover, the
restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope,
cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, and
avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself, cf. Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. Consequently, rather than
employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, the Court must balance the
privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the
intrusion here was reasonable. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99
S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660. In light of the following circumstances, considered
in combination, the Court concludes that the restriction was reasonable, and
hence lawful. First, the police had probable cause to believe that McArthur's
home contained evidence of a crime and unlawful drugs. Second, they had good
reason to fear that, unless restrained, he would destroy the drugs before they
could return with a warrant. Third, they made reasonable efforts to reconcile
their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy by avoiding a
warrantless entry or arrest and preventing McArthur only from entering his home
unaccompanied. Fourth, they imposed the restraint for a limited period, which
was no longer than reasonably necessary for them, acting with diligence, to
obtain the warrant. Pp. 3-6.
(b) The conclusion that the restriction was lawful finds significant support in
this Court's case law. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104
S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599; United States v. Place, supra, at 706, 103 S.Ct.
2637. And in no case has this Court held unlawful a temporary seizure that was
supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence
while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period. But cf.
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732. Pp. 6-7.
*2
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *2 (U.S.)) |
(c) The Court is not
persuaded by the countervailing considerations raised by the parties or lower
courts: that the police proceeded without probable cause; that, because McArthur
was on his porch, the police order that he stay outside his home amounted to an
impermissible "constructive eviction"; that an officer, with
McArthur's consent, stepped inside the home's doorway to observe McArthur when
McArthur reentered the home on two or three occasions; and that Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 742, 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, offers direct
support for McArthur's position. Pp. 7-10.
304 Ill.App.3d 395, 238 Ill.Dec. 847, 713 N.E.2d 93, reversed and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and
O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SOUTER,
J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FOURTH DISTRICT
Joel D. Bertocchi, Chicago, IL, for petitioner.
Matthew D. Roberts,
Washington, DC, for United States as amicus curiae.
Deanne F. Jones, Woodland Hills, CA, for respondent.
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Police officers, with probable cause to believe that a man had hidden marijuana
in his home, prevented that man from entering the home for about two hours while
they obtained a search warrant. We must decide whether those officers violated
the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that the officers acted reasonably. They did
not violate the Amendment's requirements. And we reverse an Illinois court's
holding to the contrary.
When Tera emerged after collecting her possessions, she spoke to Chief Love, who
was then on the porch. She suggested he check the trailer because "Chuck had
dope in there." App. 15. She added (in Love's words) that she had seen
Chuck "slid[e] some dope underneath the couch." Id., at 19.
Love knocked on the trailer door, told Charles what Tera had said, and asked for
permission to search the trailer, which Charles denied. Love then sent Officer
Skidis with Tera to get a search warrant.
*3
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *3 (U.S.)) |
Love told Charles, who
by this time was also on the porch, that he could not reenter the trailer unless
a police officer accompanied him. Charles subsequently reentered the trailer two
or three times (to get cigarettes and to make phone calls), and each time Love
stood just inside the door to observe what Charles did.
Officer Skidis obtained the warrant by about 5 p.m. He returned to the trailer
and, along with other officers, searched it. The officers found under the sofa a
marijuana pipe, a box for marijuana (called a "one-hitter" box), and a
small amount of marijuana. They then arrested Charles.
The trial court granted McArthur's suppression motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, 304 Ill.App.3d 395, 238 Ill.Dec. 847, 713 N.E.2d 93 (1999), and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition for leave to appeal, 185 Ill.2d 651, 242 Ill.Dec. 146, 720 N.E.2d 1101 (1999). We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the kind of temporary seizure at issue here.
We nonetheless have made it clear that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940-941, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam) (search of automobile supported by probable cause); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (suspicionless stops at drunk driver checkpoint); United States v. Place, supra, at 706, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (temporary seizure of luggage based on reasonable suspicion); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (temporary detention of suspect without arrest warrant to prevent flight and protect officers while executing search warrant); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (temporary stop and limited search for weapons based on reasonable suspicion).
[2] In the circumstances of the case before us, we cannot say that the warrantless seizure was per se unreasonable. It involves a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., "exigent circumstances." Cf., e.g., United States v. Place, supra, at 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637 ("[T]he exigencies of the circumstances" may permit temporary seizure without warrant); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (warrantless search for suspect and weapons reasonable where delay posed grave danger); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (warrantless blood test for alcohol reasonable where delay would have led to loss of evidence). Moreover, the restraint at issue was tailored to that need, being limited in time and scope, cf. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29-30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, and avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself, cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (" '[T]he chief evil against which the ... Fourth Amendment is directed' " is warrantless entry and search of home) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). Consequently, rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (determining lawfulness by balancing privacy and law enforcement interests); United States v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (same).
*4
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *4 (U.S.)) |
[3]
We conclude that the restriction at issue was reasonable, and hence lawful, in
light of the following circumstances, which we consider in combination.
First, the police had probable cause to believe that McArthur's trailer home
contained evidence of a crime and contraband, namely, unlawful drugs. The police
had had an opportunity to speak with Tera McArthur and make at least a very
rough assessment of her reliability. They knew she had had a firsthand
opportunity to observe her husband's behavior, in particular with respect to the
drugs at issue. And they thought, with good reason, that her report to them
reflected that opportunity. Cf. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-734,
104 S.Ct. 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) (per curiam) (upholding search warrant
issued in similar circumstances).
Second, the police had good reason to fear that, unless restrained, McArthur
would destroy the drugs before they could return with a warrant. They reasonably
might have thought that McArthur realized that his wife knew about his marijuana
stash; observed that she was angry or frightened enough to ask the police to
accompany her; saw that after leaving the trailer she had spoken with the
police; and noticed that she had walked off with one policeman while leaving the
other outside to observe the trailer. They reasonably could have concluded that
McArthur, consequently suspecting an imminent search, would, if given the
chance, get rid of the drugs fast.
Third, the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement
needs with the demands of personal privacy. They neither searched the trailer
nor arrested McArthur before obtaining a warrant. Rather, they imposed a significantly
less restrictive restraint, preventing McArthur only from entering the trailer
unaccompanied. They left his home and his belongings intact--until a neutral
Magistrate, finding probable cause, issued a warrant.
*5
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *5 (U.S.)) |
Fourth, the police
imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, namely, two hours. Cf. Terry
v. Ohio, supra, at 28, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (manner in which police act is "vital
... part of ... inquiry"). As far as the record reveals, this time period
was no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence,
to obtain the warrant. Compare United States v. Place, supra, at 709-710, 103
S.Ct. 2637 (holding 90-minute detention of luggage unreasonable based on nature
of interference with person's travels and lack of diligence of police), with
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282
(1970) (holding 29-hour detention of mailed package reasonable given unavoidable
delay in obtaining warrant and minimal nature of intrusion). Given the nature of
the intrusion and the law enforcement interest at stake, this brief seizure of
the premises was permissible.
In various other circumstances, this Court has upheld temporary restraints where needed to preserve evidence until police could obtain a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S., at 706, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (reasonable suspicion justifies brief detention of luggage pending further investigation); United States v. Van Leeuwen, supra, at 253, 90 S.Ct. 1029 (reasonable suspicion justifies detaining package delivered for mailing). Cf. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) (no need to "knock and announce" when executing a search warrant where officers reasonably suspect that evidence might be destroyed); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless search of automobile constitutionally permissible).
*6
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *6 (U.S.)) |
We have found no case
in which this Court has held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by
probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police
diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time. But cf. Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (holding
warrantless entry into and arrest in home unreasonable despite possibility that
evidence of noncriminal offense would be lost while warrant was being obtained).
[4] The Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that the police could not order McArthur to stay outside his home because McArthur's porch, where he stood at the time, was part of his home; hence the order "amounted to a constructive eviction" of McArthur from his residence. 304 Ill.App.3d, at 402, 238 Ill.Dec. 847, 713 N.E.2d, at 98. This Court has held, however, that a person standing in the doorway of a house is "in a 'public' place," and hence subject to arrest without a warrant permitting entry of the home. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). Regardless, we do not believe the difference to which the Appellate Court points--porch versus, e.g., front walk--could make a significant difference here as to the reasonableness of the police restraint; and that, from the Fourth Amendment's perspective, is what matters.
The Appellate Court also found negatively significant the fact that Chief Love, with McArthur's consent, stepped inside the trailer's doorway to observe McArthur when McArthur reentered the trailer on two or three occasions. 304 Ill.App.3d, at 402-403, 238 Ill.Dec. 847, 713 N.E.2d, at 98. McArthur, however, reentered simply for his own convenience, to make phone calls and to obtain cigarettes. Under these circumstances, the reasonableness of the greater restriction (preventing reentry) implies the reasonableness of the lesser (permitting reentry conditioned on observation).
Finally, McArthur points to a case (and we believe it is the only case) that he believes offers direct support, namely, Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra. In Welsh, this Court held that police could not enter a home without a warrant in order to prevent the loss of evidence (namely, the defendant's blood alcohol level) of the "nonjailable traffic offense" of driving while intoxicated. 466 U.S., at 742, 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. McArthur notes that his two convictions are for misdemeanors, which, he says, are as minor, and he adds that the restraint, keeping him out of his home, was nearly as serious.
*7
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *7 (U.S.)) |
We nonetheless find
significant distinctions. The evidence at issue here was of crimes that were
"jailable," not "nonjailable." See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch.
720, § 550/4(a) (1998); ch. 730, § 5/5-8-3(3) (possession of less than 2.5
grams of marijuana punishable by up to 30 days in jail); ch. 720, § 600/3.5;
ch. 730, § 5/5-8-3(1) (possession of drug paraphernalia punishable by up to one
year in jail). In Welsh, we noted that, "[g]iven that the classification of
state crimes differs widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any
particular offense seems to provide the clearest and most consistent indication
of the State's interest in arresting individuals suspected of committing
that offense." 466 U.S., at 754, n. 14, 104 S.Ct. 2091. The same reasoning
applies here, where class C misdemeanors include such widely diverse offenses as
drag racing, drinking alcohol in a railroad car or on a railroad platform,
bribery by a candidate for public office, and assault. See, e.g., Ill. Comp.
Stat., ch. 65, § 5/4-8-2 (1998); ch. 610, § 90/1; ch. 625, § 5/11-504; ch.
720, § 5/12-1.
And the restriction at issue here is less serious. Temporarily keeping a person
from entering his home, a consequence whenever police stop a person on the
street, is considerably less intrusive than police entry into the home itself in
order to make a warrantless arrest or conduct a search. Cf. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S., at 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (the Fourth Amendment's central concern is the
warrantless entry and search of the home).
We have explained above why we believe that the need to preserve evidence of a
"jailable" offense was sufficiently urgent or pressing to justify the
restriction upon entry that the police imposed. We need not decide whether the
circumstances before us would have justified a greater restriction for this type
of offense or the same restriction were only a "nonjailable" offense
at issue.
The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
*8
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *8 (U.S.)) |
|
CONCURRING OPINION |
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion subject to this afterword on two points: the
constitutionality of a greater intrusion than the one here and the
permissibility of choosing impoundment over immediate search. Respondent
McArthur's location made the difference between the exigency that justified
temporarily barring him from his own dwelling and circumstances that would have
supported a greater interference with his privacy and property. As long as he
was inside his trailer, the police had probable cause to believe that he had
illegal drugs stashed as his wife had reported and that with any sense he would
flush them down the drain before the police could get a warrant to enter and
search. This probability of destruction in anticipation of a warrant exemplifies
the kind of present risk that undergirds the accepted exigent circumstances
exception to the general warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770-771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). That risk would have
justified the police in entering McArthur's trailer promptly to make a lawful,
warrantless search. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406,
49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298-299, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). When McArthur stepped outside and
left the trailer uninhabited, the risk abated and so did the reasonableness of
entry by the police for as long as he was outside. This is so because the only
justification claimed for warrantless action here is the immediate risk, and the
limit of reasonable response by the police is set by the scope of the risk. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Since, however, McArthur wished to go back in, why was it reasonable to keep him
out when the police could perfectly well have let him do as he chose, and then
enjoyed the ensuing opportunity to follow him and make a warrantless search
justified by the renewed danger of destruction? The answer is not that the law
officiously insists on safeguarding a suspect's privacy from search, in
preference to respecting the suspect's liberty to enter his own dwelling.
Instead, the legitimacy of the decision to impound the dwelling follows from the
law's strong preference for warrants, which underlies the rule that a search
with a warrant has a stronger claim to justification on later, judicial review
than a search without one. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106, 85
S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); see also 5 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
11.2(b), p. 38 (3d ed. 1996) ("[M]ost states follow the rule which is
utilized in the federal courts: if the search or seizure was pursuant to a
warrant, the defendant has the burden of proof; but if the police acted without
a warrant the burden of proof is on the prosecution"). The law can hardly
raise incentives to obtain a warrant without giving the police a fair chance to
take their probable cause to a magistrate and get one.
|
DISSENTING OPINION |
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
*9
|
(Cite as: 2001 WL 137449, *9 (U.S.)) |
The Illinois General
Assembly has decided that the possession of less than 2.5 grams of marijuana is
a class C misdemeanor. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 550/4(a) (1998). In so
classifying the offense, the legislature made a concerted policy judgment that
the possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use does not
constitute a particularly significant public policy concern. While it is true
that this offense--like feeding livestock on a public highway or offering a
movie for rent without clearly displaying its rating [FN1]--may
warrant a jail sentence of up to 30 days, the detection and prosecution
of possessors of small quantities of this substance is by no means a law
enforcement priority in the State of Illinois.
[FN2]
|
FN1. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 605, § 5/9-124.1 (1998) (making feeding livestock on a public highway a class C misdemeanor); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §§ 395/3-395/4 (1998) (making it a class C misdemeanor to sell or rent a video that does not display the official rating of the motion picture from which it is copied). Other examples of offenses classified as Class C misdemeanors in Illinois include camping on the side of a public highway, Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 605, § 5/9-124 (1998), interfering with the "lawful taking of wild animals," Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 125/2 (1998), and tattooing the body of a person under 21 years of age, Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, § 5/12-10 (1998). |
|
FN2. Nor in many other States. Under the laws of many other States, the maximum penalty McArthur would have faced for possession of 2.3 grams of marijuana would have been less than what he faced in Illinois. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11357(b) (West 1991) ($100 fine); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-18-406(1) (1999) ($100 fine); Minn.Stat. § 152.027(4) (2000) ($200 fine and drug education); Miss.Code Ann. § 41- |
29-139(c)(2)(A)
(Supp.1999) ($100-$250 fine); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28- 416(13) (1995) ($100 fine and
drug education); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-31- 23(B) (1997) ($50-$100 fine and 15
days in jail); N.Y. Penal Law § 221.05 (McKinney 2000) ($100 fine);
Ore.Rev.Stat. § 475.992(4)(f) (Supp.1998) ($100 fine).
Because the governmental interest implicated by the particular criminal
prohibition at issue in this case is so slight, this is a poor vehicle for
probing the boundaries of the government's power to limit an individual's
possessory interest in his or her home pending the arrival of a search warrant.
Cf. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984)
(seven Justices decline to address this issue because case does not require its
resolution). Given my preference, I would, therefore, dismiss the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted.
Compelled by the vote of my colleagues to reach the merits, I would affirm. As
the majority explains, the essential inquiry in this case involves a balancing
of the "privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine
if the intrusion was reasonable." Ante, at ----, 4. Under the specific
facts of this case, I believe the majority gets the balance wrong. Each of the
Illinois jurists who participated in the decision of this case placed a higher
value on the sanctity
of the ordinary citizen's home than on the prosecution of this petty offense.
They correctly viewed that interest--whether the home be a humble cottage, a
secondhand trailer, or a stately mansion--as one meriting the most serious
constitutional protection. [FN3]
Following their analysis and the reasoning in our decision in Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (holding that
some offenses may be so minor as to make it unreasonable for police to undertake
searches that would be constitutionally permissible if graver offenses were
suspected), I would affirm.
|
FN3. Principled respect for the sanctity of the home has long animated this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) ("The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home"); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (emphasizing "the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic"); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's |
|
If you have come to this page from an outside location click here to get back to mindfully.org |
