End Sanctions on India 

Commentary By Gopalaswami Parthasarathy / Wall Street Journal 17aug01

NEW DELHI -- In November 1988, a group of mercenaries took over the island republic of Maldives, located close to the U.S. base at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean. After consulting the Reagan White House, India used its airlift capabilities to intervene within hours, deploying nearly a brigade of its elite paratroopers to restore power to the democratically elected government on the island.

This was one of the few instances where a shared commitment to democratic values, peace and stability united the world's most powerful democracy and the world's most populous one. So what prevents India and the U.S. from coming together once again on the basis of shared values and interests to guarantee peace, stability and cooperation in the Indian Ocean region -- an area that has two-thirds of the world's reserves of oil and a one-third of global gas reserves?


A great irony of the Cold War was that India and the U.S. were regarded as estranged democracies rather than natural allies. While Indian democracy grew resilient during these years, the propensity for excessive state control on economic and business activity stifled individual initiative and retarded economic growth. While India emerged as a country self-reliant in agriculture and with a strong scientific base, there was a growing realization that protectionist barriers had rendered large sections of the country's industry obsolete and uncompetitive.

The economic reforms implemented over the past decade have resulted in an annual growth rate averaging over 6.5%. But there is a burgeoning national consensus that India should, and must, grow at 7% to 8% annually in the current decade if it is to emerge as a credible power in its neighborhood. India needs allies like the U.S. as it embarks on this effort. This is only natural, as the U.S. is today India's largest trading and investment partner.

Surprising as it may sound, differences between India and the U.S. over India's nuclear program have resulted in economic, military and technological sanctions being imposed on India over the past three decades. These sanctions were tightened and enhanced when India tested nuclear weapons and announced its decision to develop a "credible, minimum deterrent" in May 1998.

These last sanctions resulted in India being denied loans from international financial institutions, and an embargo on military contacts and scientific and technical cooperation. A study by the International Trade Commission, undertaken at the behest of the Ways and Means Committee of Congress, concluded in September 1999 that U.S. sanctions had a "relatively minimal impact" on the Indian economy and that the reputation of American companies as reliable suppliers had been adversely affected by the imposition of these sanctions. The Clinton administration soon came to realize that sanctions on India had not retarded the country's economic growth or halted its nuclear program. The two countries commenced a wide-ranging dialogue to reconcile India's security imperatives with valid American concerns about India's nuclear program.

New Delhi has been delighted by the sensitivity and interest that the Bush administration has shown toward India. Jaswant Singh, India's minister for external affairs and defense, was warmly received at the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department. Brajesh Mishra, the national security adviser to India's prime minister, had wide-ranging discussions with Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. A series of senior officials from the Bush administration, including Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry Shelton, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick have visited Delhi for high-level consultations. Indian strategists hope that all this will set the stage for intense cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, extending across the sea lanes from Malacca to Hormuz.

It is with these, and broader, considerations in mind that the Bush administration has decided to start working with Congress to lift the sanctions placed on India. The extended dialogue on nuclear issues has helped clear up some American misunderstandings of Indian nuclear policy.

A recent study by the Rand Corp. acknowledges that what India is building is a relatively modest deterrent, one that would give it the capability to retaliate with "certainty and speed" if attacked. The study notes that "as long as India maintains conventional superiority over Pakistan and China (in the theater)" it will adhere to its policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. It adds that given India's disinclination to acquire any extended deterrence obligations in Asia, Indian strategists are confident that there is little or no possibility of nuclear weapons being used by their country in South Asia or elsewhere. India is not a nuclear bull in a China shop. There appears to be increasing understanding now in Washington that New Delhi intends to adopt a low-key and responsible nuclear posture, and to cooperate with others in curbing the spread of nuclear and missile technologies.

The end of the anachronistic sanctions regime against India will be a symbolic, but important, step in laying the foundations for two hitherto estranged democracies to become natural partners in a world order dedicated to pluralistic, democratic values. The real challenges that democracies such as ours face today are those posed by medieval manifestations of religious bigotry and intolerance. A cooperative relationship between India and the U.S. will provide an enduring basis to address such challenges, and to promote peace, prosperity and stability across the strategically vital Indian Ocean region.