US Drug Certification 

An Activist's Guide to Eliminating a Harmful Policy 

Latin America Working Group 

How would you feel if your messy roommate told you that you were a slob?  It’s probably safe to say that you would feel insulted, even resentful.  Every spring, the US government exhibits similarly obnoxious behavior by “certifying” whether or not other countries are cooperating with the United States in the war on drugs even though the US has had little success in curbing drug abuse here at home.

Certification is based on the idea that the US knows best how to solve the international drug problem. Our government insists that if the US model of law enforcement and/or militarization is not being pursued by another country, it must not be trying hard enough.  Theoretically, if the supply of drugs to the United States were reduced, the price would rise and consumption would fall.  Supply and demand.  So each year the US government judges other countries’ efforts to cooperate with the US in its war on drugs.

However, the US model fails to account for the fact that the illegal drug trade is largely driven by demand, not just by supply.  Despite all the money the US government has spent in the war on drugs, there has been little impact on the overall trade; today drugs are cheaper, purer and more readily available on US streets than ever before.

The illegal drug trade is a transnational problem and no country, no matter how hard it tries, can effectively combat it alone.  The certification policy is counterproductive because, instead of generating cooperation, it creates friction between the United States and the very countries we must work with to construct a more effective drug policy.

The certification process allows politicians to look tough on drugs by punishing other countries.  It shifts the blame from us to them.  The leverage that the US wields in the certification process  coerces other countries to adopt the US model for combating drugs; one that focuses on reducing supply through law enforcement efforts or militarization instead of considering alternative policies that might be more effective.  Counter-drug programs supported by the US in Latin America have become increasingly militarized, which has had a negative impact on human rights and civil liberties.

There is no easy answer to the drug problem.  Ending certification will not provide a quick fix, but it is a step in the right direction.  Policy makers need to consider a new approach that takes into account the complete impact that current US drug control policy has on other nations.  Getting rid of certification is just the beginning.

The Certification Policy: An Explanation 

In 1986, the US Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to include a provision that bars countries from receiving several forms of aid if they are not certified by the President as cooperating in the war on drugs.  Congress created this mechanism in an effort to force other countries to cooperate in anti-drug programs.

 The law dictates that before November 1 of each year, the President must send Congress a list of all the countries that are considered “major illicit drug producing countries” and “major drug transit countries.”  This is often referred to as the “majors list.”  Major drug producing countries are those that cultivate over 1000 hectares of opium poppy (used for heroin), 1000 hectares of coca (used for cocaine), or 5000 hectares of cannabis (used for marijuana).  Major drug transit countries are those through which drugs are transported into the United States. 

Twenty-four countries worldwide currently meet one or both of these criteria, including Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Mexico in Latin America.  By March 1 of the following year, the President must announce which countries on the list he has certified as cooperating in the war on drugs.  Congress then has thirty days to overturn the President’s decision by approving a joint resolution, meaning the House and Senate must agree.  If no congressional action is taken, the President’s decision stands.

Major drug-producing and trafficking countries that are denied certification face a range of sanctions.  With the exception of humanitarian and anti-drug aid, the US government cuts all other forms of economic assistance.  US representatives to multilateral banks (such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) must automatically vote against all loans or grants to a “decertified” country.  The President may also exercise discretionary trade sanctions by removing trade preferences and suspending import quotas for a “decertified” country.  If the President feels that these sanctions could jeopardize other US interests, he may issue a national interest waiver for countries that he would otherwise deny certification.

Until recent years the certification process had been a rather predictable charade.  The only countries that were denied certification under Presidents Reagan and Bush were ones with which the US had limited or no relations.  Under President Clinton, certification was denied more broadly, but the policy was applied in a less consistent manner than before.  For example, in 1997, Clinton denied certification to Colombia for the second year in a row on the basis of presidential corruption charges. At the same time he  certified  Mexico despite evidence of high-level drug-related corruption within the Mexican government.  It was apparent that Clinton’s decision was based on the US’ economic relationship with Mexico under NAFTA and not on Mexico’s performance in the drug war.  This created a great deal of debate surrounding certification here in the US and many Latin American nations began to express their dislike of the policy more openly.

A Certified Failure

Certification is an ineffective and counterproductive drug control policy.  It has not reduced overall international drug production and trafficking and it ignores the failure of US counter-drug programs to decrease drug abuse and related crimes here at home.  Certification creates friction in our relations with other nations when cooperation is sorely needed to effectively decrease drug production and consumption, as well as combat the corruption and violence associated with the illegal drug trade.

1. Certification is part of a US war on drugs that has failed to produce results.  When US-sponsored programs decrease drug production and trafficking in one area, it just pops up somewhere else--the balloon effect.

Certification has had no impact on curbing the steady flow of drugs into the United States because dents made in drug production or trafficking in one country cause shifts of production and trafficking to other places.  This is referred to as the “balloon effect.”  

A good example of this is in the Andean countries of Peru and Bolivia, where the US supported programs to eradicate coca cultivation and to interdict (intercept) airplane shipments of coca en route to Colombia to be processed into cocaine.  These programs decreased cultivation in Peru and Bolivia and stopped coca from crossing into Colombia, but they hardly made a dent in overall cocaine production in the Andean region.  Colombian drug traffickers, faced with a drop in their coca supply, began cultivating coca at home, rather than relying on Peruvian or Bolivian suppliers.  The result: cultivation in Colombia increased 54% from 1996 to 1998, leaving overall Andean coca production constant. While Colombia had never before been a major source of coca leaf, it is now the world’s leading producer. 

The US has increased its anti-drug spending in Colombia in the past two years, the latest installment being $1.3 billion of mostly military aid.  Human rights groups criticize the US aid package because they feel it will destroy prospects for peace and intensify the civil conflict there. Leaders in bordering countries have expressed concern that US aid will push the Colombian conflict along with drug cultivation and trafficking over their borders. Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller said his nation “has to be aware of the cancerous tumor being removed from Colombia and metastasizing in Ecuador. Right now, Ecuador does not have drug plantations. We don’t have them, and we don’t want them” (Washington Post, September 1, 2000, A1).

Because of the balloon effect, the drug problem cannot be solved by one country alone or even two countries working together.  Strategies pursued by two countries will have an impact on a third.  Anti-drug policies should be crafted in an international forum where everyone can work together to come up with effective strategies.  The US must undertake a serious reevaluation of its drug control policy if that kind of cooperation is to exist.  Overturning certification will allow a better debate on drug policy to take place in the international arena.

2.  Certification is counterproductive because, instead of generating cooperation, it creates friction between the US and the very countries we must work with to create an effective drug control policy.

 Latin American countries resent being judged by the world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs.  Many in Latin America view their drug-related problems as a product of US demand, and are insulted when the US government points a judgmental finger at them. 

The certification policy is supposed to boost cooperation, but cooperation does not occur when one nation tells another that it must cooperate “or else.”  Cooperation should be based on mutual evaluation and goal-setting, but certification is based only on the US government’s idea of what constitutes progress in the war on drugs.  If Latin American nations could have their say, perhaps they would decertify the US for its failure to reduce domestic demand for illegal drugs, which many in Latin America view as the driving force behind the illegal drug trade.

3.  Certification is leverage used by the US to ensure other governments adopt a US-style, militarized war on drugs.  In Latin America, this strategy has contributed to serious human rights abuses.

To fight drug production and trafficking and impress the US government, Latin American countries step up their efforts to arrest and jail alleged drug producers and traffickers by passing laws that make it easier to do so and giving a greater anti-drug role to the military.  This may seem like a good thing to do, but it is dangerous in countries where civil liberties are not effectively guaranteed, judicial systems are already weak and corrupt, and militaries commit abuse with impunity. 

A 1999 State Department report applauded the Mexican government’s efforts to “amend the code of criminal procedure and the law protecting constitutional guarantees to ensure that the accused are tried and sentenced without escape on legal technicalities.”  Amendments like these have granted police and soldiers in Mexico the power to arrest suspects without a warrant if caught in the act of a crime or up to 72 hours thereafter.  Once arrested, the public prosecutor has two to four days to obtain a declaration from the suspect and present him to a judge. But because detainees are not guaranteed access to a public defender during this lengthy interrogation period, coercion and even torture are sometimes used to obtain confessions.  Coerced confessions have been used by judges to convict defendants, even in cases where there is evidence suggesting their innocence.

In 1989, the Bolivian Congress passed Law 1008, the Law to Regulate Coca and Controlled Substances, in an effort to meet requirements set out in a 1987 counternarcotics agreement with the United States.  Law 1008 sets up a parallel court system to handle drug offenses and contains provisions that allow authorities to detain alleged drug traffickers without sound evidence for upwards of three to four years while they await trial.  According to the Washington Office on Latin America, Law 1008 victimizes Bolivia’s poor, as they are less likely to have the resources to mount an adequate defense, and therefore, end up languishing in Bolivia’s prisons.

Ecuador has a similarly draconian anti-narcotics law, which was also written under pressure from the US.  The Ecuadoran law allows authorities to detain a person merely on suspicion of drug trafficking, without evidence to warrant an arrest.  The Ecuadoran Ecumenical Commission on Human Rights states that torture is often used to extract confessions from suspected drug traffickers and that between 1991 and 1996, a quarter of the documented cases of torture involved charges of drug trafficking.  Ecuador’s anti-narcotics law has been criticized by human rights organizations as being unconstitutional and in violation of international human rights law.

Here’s what leaders in Latin America have to say about certification:

 • “How does the country which figures as the principal market for narcotics get off certifying the efforts of other nations in this area?” Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Jose Vicente Rangel at the 29 th General Assembly of the Organization of America States held in Guatemala in June 1999.

 • “[Mexico] rejects mechanisms such as the certification process which violate principles founded in international law and respect for the dignity that should exist between countries.” Jorge Madrazo Cuellar, Mexican Attorney General, on February 26, 1999 at an international conference on corruption held in Mexico City.

 • “What comes to mind is how arbitrary, unilateral and lastly absurd this whole certification mechanism is.” Quote from a leading daily newspaper in Colombia, El Tiempo, February 28, 1999.

 • “Satisfaction with having obtained Washington’s certification cannot make us accept this harmful and disagreeable process.  The illicit drug phenomenon has grown in all possible dimensions.  Certification has not promoted more effective cooperation.” Quote from an editorial in the Colombian paper, El Espectador, in February 1998.

The following cases illustrate how the war on drugs has contributed to human rights abuses in Latin America.

 Adela Rojas - Bolivia

 In June 1999 Adela went to the police station to identify a cousin who had dropped by her house  earlier to pick up some things and was now being held on drug trafficking charges.  She brought her baby boy along.  After she positively identified her cousin, Adela and her baby were locked up.  Her cousin claimed she had carried bags containing illicit drugs from her house to his taxi earlier that day.  Under Law 1008, this is considered drug trafficking.  Adela says she had absolutely no knowledge of the contents of her cousin’s luggage.  She and her son have been sleeping on the prison floor ever since and her case has still not gone to trial.  More than 1,000 of the 1,400 prisoners jailed in Cochabamba, Bolivia have not been sentenced or gone to trial (Schultz, 1999).

Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera - Mexico

 Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera, Mexican environmental activists opposing illegal logging in their communities, were illegally arrested in Pizotla, Guerrero on May 2, 1999 by soldiers. After five days of torture, they signed confessions to illegal weapons possession and marijuana cultivation, which were later used by a federal judge to convict and sentence them to six and ten years in jail.  The forced confessions were the primary pieces of evidence against them.

Ruben Cespedes - Bolivia

 Ruben was accused of drug trafficking in a case of mistaken identity.  He claims the arresting officers called him by a name he did not know and insisted he was the one they were looking for.  When he refused to sign an incriminating statement, he said the officers tortured him for over three hours, beating him and applying electric current to his testicles.  He was also held in solitary confinement for nine days without access to a lawyer.  When Ruben finally got his day in court, he told the judge of his torture.  The judge asked one of the officers Ruben had implicated in his torture if the allegations were true, but the officer denied everything.  The judge did not seek an investigation into the torture allegations and Ruben spent three years in jail.  Under Law 1008, an official’s testimony is considered evidence and is difficult to dispute (Andean Information Network, 1996).

Antonio Mendoza and Evaristo Albino - Mexico

 On April 20, 1999, Antonio Mendoza (12 years old) and Evaristo Albino (27 years old), from the community of Barrio Nuevo San José, Guerrero, disappeared after leaving one morning to work on their farm. Two female relatives went to the farm to search for them.  After finding blood in the fields, they were chased by soldiers, who caught and raped them.  More than two weeks later, on May 7, the bodies of the two men were found decomposing in bags in the morgue in Acapulco, Guerrero.  The Ministry of Defense accused the victims of drug trafficking in an attempt to justify the soldiers’ actions.

TAKE ACTION

             In recent years a number of reform-minded policymakers have spoken out about the counterproductive nature of the certification policy and the need to reevaluate it.  Let your members of Congress know how you feel about certification.  You can use the sample letter below as a basis for your own letter or for talking points if you’d like to give your representative or senators a call.

 Dear Representative/Senator:

             I am writing to express my disagreement with the annual drug certification policy, which judges other countries’ cooperation with US anti-drug efforts.  It is an ineffective and counterproductive policy, and I urge you to support efforts to end it for the following reasons:

 • Certification is part of a US war on drugs that has failed to produce results.  When US-sponsored programs decrease drug production and trafficking in one area, it just pops up somewhere else.

 • Certification is counterproductive because, instead of generating cooperation, it creates friction between the US and the very countries we must work with to create an effective drug control policy.

 • Certification sends the wrong message to governments in Latin America.  It is leverage used by the US to ensure other governments adopt a US-style, militarized war on drugs.  In Latin America, this strategy has contributed to serious human rights abuses.

It is time for our government to reevaluate its approach to international drug control policy.  The devastation wrought by drug abuse and the drug trade merits real solutions.  I urge you to support measures to overturn the certification policy, and open the door to an honest discussion of current US drug control strategies and the negative impact they have on our society’s health and welfare.

Thank you for your attention to my concerns.

Send your letters to:

The Honorable [representative or senator’s name]
US House of Representatives or US Senate
Washington, DC 20515 (House) or 20510 (Senate)

You can also reach your members of Congress by calling the US Capitol Switchboard at (202) 224-3121.

Please note: the certification process generates the most debate in February and early March around the President’s certification decision.  It would be timely to contact your members of Congress early in 2001 to express your opinions on the certification policy.

During the course of the year, look for specific action alerts and legislative updates on our website. http://www.lawg.org

Useful online resources on US drug control policy:

 • International Narcotics Control Strategy Report on the State Department website at www.state.gov

 • DRC Net drug reform coordination network at www.drcnet.org

An absolute wealth of information on US drug control policy and drug policy reform with tons of links to other drug policy reform groups, weekly updates on drug policy news, and the world’s largest online library of drug policy information.

 • Just the Facts: A civilian’s guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean at www.ciponline.org/facts

A project of the Latin America Working Group in cooperation with the Center for International Policy.

 • The Lindesmith Center - Drug Policy Foundation at www.dpf.org

The Drug Policy Foundation is an independent, nonprofit organization representing over 24,000 supporters who favor alternatives to the current war on drugs. DPF believes that current drug policy is not working. It is time to examine reasoned and compassionate alternatives. Examples of sensible drug policies already exist in other countries and, to some extent, in the United States. The Drug Policy Foundation favors a shift away from criminal justice policies and a shift toward public health approaches to drug use and abuse.

• Washington Office on Latin America at www.wola.org

The Washington Office on Latin America promotes human rights, democracy and social and economic justice in Latin America and the Caribbean.  WOLA facilitates dialogue between governmental and non-governmental actors, monitors the impact of policies and programs of governments and international organizations, and promotes alternatives through reporting, education, training and advocacy.

WOLA published “U.S. International Drug Control Policy: A Guide for Citizen Action,” which you can download from their website.

 • Drug Strategies at www.drugstrategies.org

Drug Strategies is a non-profit research institute that promotes more effective approaches to the nation’s drug problems and supports private and public initiatives that reduce the demand for drugs through prevention, treatment and law enforcement.

 • Institute for Policy Studies at www.ips-dc.org

 The IPS Drug Policy Project advocates for reform by reaching out to non-traditional allies and employing innovative tactics to promote a sustainable, constitutional, and humane drug control policy. The project’s mission is to help foster a paradigm shift by replacing the punitive and coercive “social control” model of drug policy with a public health and community economic development model.

Sources used in this guide:

Andean Information Network (1996). The Weight of Law 1008. Cochabamba, Bolivia.

“Passing Judgment: The U.S. Drug Certification Process” (1998).  Washington, DC: Drug Strategies.

Schultz, Jim (1999).  “When the War on Drugs Becomes War on the Poor.”  Published in the Sacramento Bee, August 1, 1999.

Sterling, Eric (1999).  “U.S. Drug Policy: Failure at Home.”  Foreign Policy In Focus Vol. 4, No. 31, November 1999. Published by the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies.

Williams, Jacqueline (1997). “Waging the War on Drugs in Bolivia.”  Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America.

US Department of State (March 2000), International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999.

US Information Agency Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest, March 3, 1999.

The two cases from Mexico came from the Miguel Agustín Pro Juarez Human Rights Center in Mexico City.