OIG Report on CIA Accountability
With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks
(June 2005) Released 21aug2007
[This HTML version from PDF at CIA website | CIA press release below]
(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the CIA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and undertake whatever additional investigations were necessary to determine whether any Agency employees were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided before the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), or should be held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner.
(U) The Accountability Review Team assembled by the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and functioning of the Agency's many components involved with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do so. As a result, this account does not document the many successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels (including many whose actions are discussed in this report) in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11.
(U) Similarly, because this report was designed to address accountability issues, it does not include recommendations relating to the systemic problems that were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior Agency managers. In its regular program of audits, investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review the counterterrorism programs and operations of the Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that might be improved.
(U) After conducting its review, the Inspector General Team reports that, while its findings differ from those of the JI on a number of matters, it reaches the same overall conclusions on most of the important issues.
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Concerning certain issues, the Team concluded that the Agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the Inspector General recommends that the Director, Central Intelligence Agency establish an Accountability Board made up of individuals who are not employees of the Agency to review the performance of some individuals and assess their potential accountability.
(U) In its deliberations, the Team used a "reasonable person" approach and relied on Agency regulations-which are subjective-concerning standards of accountability. A discussion of those regulations is included in the Foreword. While the Team found that many officers performed their responsibilities in an exemplary fashion, it did not recommend individuals for additional recognition because these officers already have been rewarded.
(U) The Team found no instance in which an employee violated the law, and none of the errors discussed herein involves misconduct. Rather, the review focuses on areas where individuals did not perform their duties in a satisfactory manner; that is, they did not-with regard to the specific issue or issues discussed-act "in accordance with a reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence," as required by Agency regulation. On occasion, the Team has found that a specific officer was responsible for a particular action or lack of action, but has not recommended that an Accountability Board review the officer's performance. Such a conclusion reflects the Team's view that extenuating circumstances mitigate the case.
(U) The findings of greatest concern are those that identify systemic problems where the Agency's programs or processes did not work as they should have, and concerning which a number of persons were involved or aware, or should have been. Where the Team found systemic failures, it has recommended that an Accountability Board assess the performance and accountability of those managers who, by virtue of their position and authorities, might reasonably have been expected to oversee and correct the process. In general, the fact that failures were systemic should not absolve responsible officials from accountability.
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(U) The Review Team found that Agency officers from the top down worked hard against the al-Qa'ida and Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) targets. They did not always work effectively and cooperatively, however. The Team found neither a "single point of failure" nor a "silver bullet" that would have enabled the Intelligence Community (IC) to predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks. The Team did find, however, failures to implement and manage important processes, to follow through with operations, and to properly share and analyze critical data. If IC officers had been able to view and analyze the full range of information available before 11 September 2001, they could have developed a more informed context in which to assess the threat reporting of the spring and summer that year.
(U) This review focuses only on those findings of the Joint Inquiry that relate to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Team cooperated with the Department of Justice Inspector General and the Kean Commission as they pursued their separate inquiries. For this report, the Team interviewed officers from other agencies who had been detailed to the CIA in the period before 9/11, but did not undertake to interview systematically other officers outside CIA and the IC Management Staff. This report reaches no conclusions about the performance of other agencies or their personnel.
(U) Senior Leadership and Management of the Counterterrorism Effort
(U) The JI concluded that, before 9/11, neither the US Government nor the IC had a comprehensive strategy for combating al-Qa'ida. It charged that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of IC resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United States. The OIG Team also found that the IC did not have a documented, comprehensive approach to al-Qa'ida and that the DCI did not use all of his authorities in leading the IC's strategic effort against UBL.
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(C) The Team found that the DCI was actively and forcefully
engaged in the counterterrorism efforts of the CIA. Beginning in 1999, he
received regular updates, often daily, on efforts to track and disrupt UBL. He
was personally engaged in sounding the alarm about the threat to many different
audiences in the policy community, military, Congress, and public, and he worked
directly and personally with foreign counterparts to encourage their
cooperation.
(S/ /NF) In December 1998, the DCI signed a memorandum
in which he declared: "We are at war." In addition to directives
related to collection programs and other matters, this memorandum stated that
the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) would chair an interagency
group to formulate an integrated, interagency plan to counter the terrorist
challenge posed by Usama Bin Ladin. The DCI wrote that he wanted "...no
resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the
Community."
(S/ /NF) The Team found that neither the DCI nor the
DDCI followed up these warnings and admonitions by creating a documented,
comprehensive plan to guide the counterterrorism effort at the Intelligence
Community level. The DDCI chaired at least one meeting in response to the DCI
directive, but the forum soon devolved into one of tactical and operational,
rather than strategic, discussions. These subsequent meetings were chaired by
the Executive Director of the CIA and included few if any officers from other IC
agencies. While CIA and other agencies had individual plans and important
initiatives underway, senior officers in the Agency and Community told the Team
that no comprehensive strategic plan for the IC to counter UBL was created in
response to the DCI's memorandum, or at any time prior to 9/11.
(S/ /NF) The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was not
used effectively as a strategic coordinator of the IC's counterterrorism
efforts. CTC's stated mission includes the production of all-source intelligence
and the coordination of the IC's counterterrorism efforts. Before 9/11, however,
the Center's focus was primarily operational and tactical. While
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focusing on operations is critically important and does not necessarily mean that other elements of mission will be ignored, the Team found that this nearly exclusive focus-which resulted in many operational successes-had a negative impact on CTC's effectiveness as a coordinator of IC counterterrorism strategy. The Team found that the most effective interagency effort against UBL was that of the Assistant DCI for Collection, who, from the early months of 1998 to 9/11, worked with representatives of several intelligence agencies to stimulate collection.
(S/ /NF) In the years leading up to 9/11, the DCI
worked hard and with some success, at the most senior levels of government, to
secure additional budgetary resources to rebuild the CIA and the IC. At the same
time, the Team found that he did not use his senior position and unique
authorities to work with the National Security Council to elevate the relative
standing of counterterrorism in the formal ranking of intelligence priorities,
or to alter the deployment of human and financial resources across agencies in a
coordinated approach to the terrorism target. While the nature of the IC makes
the mission of managing it problematic and difficult, the DCI at the time had
some authority to move manpower and funds among agencies. The Team found that,
in the five years prior to 9/11, the DCI on six occasions
used these authorities to move almost 
in funds from other agencies to the CIA for a number of important purposes
One of
these transfers helped fund a Middle East program that was terrorism-related,
but none supported programs designed to counter UBL or al-Qa'ida. Nor were DCI
authorities used to transfer any personnel into these programs in the five years
prior to 9/11.
(C/ /NF) The Team notes that the former DCI recognized
the need for an integrated, interagency plan, and believes that such a plan was
needed to mobilize all of the operational, analytic, and resource capabilities
of the IC to enable the several agencies of the Community to work cooperatively
and with maximum effectiveness against al-Qa'ida. At the same time, the Team
concludes that the former DCI, by virtue of his position, bears ultimate
responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was
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ever created, despite his specific direction that this should be done.
(S/ /NF) The JI report discussed a persistent strain
in relations between CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) that impeded
collaboration between the two agencies in dealing with the terrorist challenge
from al-Qa'ida. The Team, likewise, found that significant differences existed
between CIA and NSA over their respective authorities. The Team did not document
in detail or take a position on the merits of this disagreement, but notes that
the differences remained unresolved well into 2001 in spite of the fact that
considerable management attention was devoted to the issue, including at the
level of the Agency's Deputy Executive Director. Senior officers of the CIA and
the IC Management Staff stated that these interagency differences had a negative
impact on the IC's ability to perform its mission and that only the DCI's
vigorous personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution of the
matter.
(C) Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the
performance of the former DCI for failing to act personally to resolve the
differences between CIA and NSA in an effective and timely manner.
(U) See the Team's discussions of Systemic Findings 2 (The DCI's Role); 4 (Application of Technology); and 7 (Computer Exploitation) for discussion of these issues.
(U) Management of CIA's Resources for Counterterrorism
(C) Funding for the Agency's counterterrorism programs
increased significantly from Fiscal Year (FY)1998 to FY 2001 as a result of
supplemental appropriations. These funds were appropriated, in part, because of
the efforts of the CIA's Director and senior leaders to convince the
Administration and Congress that the Agency was short of resources for
counterterrorism and other key programs. The Team preparing this report did not
attempt to reach a
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conclusion regarding the proper level of funding for counterterrorism programs.
(S) The Team did find, however, that during the same period
they were appealing the shortage of resources, senior officials were not
effectively managing the Agency's counterterrorism funds. In particular, Agency
managers moved funds from the base budgets of the Counterterrorist Center and
other counterterrorism programs to meet other corporate and Directorate of
Operations (DO) needs. The Team found that from FY 1997 to FY 2001 (as of 9/11),
was
redistributed from counterterrorism programs to other Agency priorities. Some of
these funds were used to strengthen the infrastructure of the DO and, thus,
indirectly supported counterterrorism efforts; other funds were used to cover
nonspecific corporate "taxes" and for a variety of purposes that,
based on the Agency's budgetary definitions, were unrelated to terrorism.
Conversely, no resources were reprogrammed from other Agency programs to
counterterrorism, even after the DCI's statement in December 1998 that he wanted
no resources spared in the effort. The Team found that the Agency made little
use of the Reserve for Contingencies to support its counterterrorism effort.
Finally, CTC managers did not spend all of the funds in their base budget, even
after it had been reduced by diversions of funds to other programs.
(C) The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review
the performance of the Executive Director, the Deputy Director for Operations,
and the Chief of CTC during the years prior to 9/11 regarding their management
of the Agency's counterterrorism financial resources, including specifically
their redirection of funds from counterterrorism programs to other priorities.
(C) Concerning human resources, the Team found that the unit
within CTC responsible for Usama Bin Ladin, UBL Station, by the accounts of all
who worked there, had an excessive workload. Most of its officers did not have
the operational experience, expertise, and training necessary to accomplish
their mission in an effective manner. Taken together, these weaknesses
contributed to performance lapses related to the handling of materials
concerning
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individuals who were to become the 9/11 hijackers. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the Chiefs of CTC during the period 1997-2001 regarding the manner in which they staffed the UBL component.
(C) The Team found that certain units within CTC did not
work effectively together to understand the structure and operations of
al-Qa'ida. This situation had a particularly negative impact on performance with
respect to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. The
Team, like the Joint Inquiry, found that CTC's assigning principal
responsibility for KSM to the Renditions Branch had the consequence that the
resources of the Sunni Extremist Group, UBL Station, and CTC analysts were not
effectively brought to bear on the problem. CTC considered KSM to be a
high-priority target for apprehension and rendition, but did not recognize the
significance of reporting from credible sources in 2000 and 2001 that portrayed
him as a senior al-Qa'ida lieutenant and thus missed important indicators of
terrorist planning. This intelligence reporting was not voluminous and its
significance is obviously easier to determine in hindsight, but it was
noteworthy even in the pre-9/11 period because it included the allegation that
KSM was sending terrorists to the United States to engage in activities on
behalf of Bin Ladin.
(C) The evidence indicates that the management approach
employed in CTC had the effect of actively reinforcing the separation of
responsibilities among the key CTC units working on KSM. The Team recommends
that an Accountability Board review the performance of the
and for
failure to provide proper oversight ana guidance to their officers; to
coordinate effectively with other units; and to allocate the workload to ensure
that KSM was being covered appropriately. The Team also recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of the Chief of CTC for failure to
ensure that CTC units worked in a coordinated, effective manner against KSM.
Finally, the Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance
of the for
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failure to produce any
coverage of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad from 1997 to 2001.1
(U) See the Team's discussions of Systemic Finding 3 (Counterterrorism Resources) and Factual Finding 5i (Khalid Shaykh Muhammad) for further information on these issues.
(U) Information Sharing
(C) The Team's findings related to the issue of
information sharing are in general accord with the JI's overall assessment of
CIA's performance. Like the JI, the Team found problems in the functioning of
two separate but related processes in the specific case of the Malaysia
operation of early 2000: entering the names of suspected al-Qa'ida terrorists on
the "watchlist" of the Department of State and providing information
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in proper channels. The Team also
found that CTC did not forward relevant information to
In regard to broader issues of information sharing, the Team found basic
problems with processes designed to facilitate such sharing. In particular, CTC
managers did not clarify the roles and responsibilities of officers detailed to
CTC by other agencies.
(S/ /NF) The Malaysia Operation. Agency
officers did not, on a timely basis, recommend to the Department of State the
watchlisting of two suspected al-Qa'ida terrorists, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid
al-Mihdhar. These individuals, who later were among the hijackers of 9/11, were
known by the Agency in early January 2000 to have traveled to Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, to participate in a meeting of suspected terrorists. From Kuala
Lumpur, they traveled to Bangkok. In January 2000, CTC officers received
information that one of these suspected terrorists had a US visa; in March 2000,
1 (U) As a result of a conflict of interest, the Inspector General recused himself from deliberations on the performance of Agency components and individuals relating to the KSM issue and to the strategic analysis issues discussed below. The two successive Deputy Inspectors General did participate in accountability discussions regarding analysis and all other issues.
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these officers had information that the other had flown from Bangkok to Los Angeles.
(S/ /NF) In the period January
through March 2000, some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency
cables containing travel information related to these terrorists. These cables
originated in four field locations and Headquarters. They were read by overseas
officers and Headquarters personnel, operations officers and analysts, managers
and junior employees, and CIA staff personnel as well as officers on rotation
from NSA and FBI. Over an 18-month period, some of these officers had
opportunities to review the information on multiple occasions, when they might
have recognized its significance and shared it appropriately with other
components and agencies. Ultimately, the two terrorists were watchlisted in late
August 2001 as a result of questions raised in May 2001 by a CIA officer on
assignment at the FBI.
(S) In 1998, CTC assumed responsibility for communicating
watchlisting guidance in the Agency. As recently as December 1999, less than a
month before the events of early January 2000, CTC had sent to all field offices
of the CIA a cable reminding them of their obligation to watchlist suspected
terrorists and the procedures for doing so. Field components and Headquarters
units had obligations related to watchlisting, but they varied widely in their
performance. That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects a
systemic breakdown-a breakdown caused by excessive workload, ambiguities about
responsibilities, and mismanagement of the program. Basically, there was no
coherent, functioning watchlisting program.
(S/ /NF) The Review Team recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC in the
years between 1998 and 2001 concerning their leadership and management oversight
of the watchlisting program.
Agency officers also failed to pass the travel information about the two terrorists to the FBI in the prescribed channels. The Team found that an FBI officer
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assigned to CTC on 5 January 2000 drafted a message about the terrorists' travel that was to be sent from CIA to the FBI in the proper channels. Apparently because it was in the wrong format or needed editing, the message was never sent. On the same date, another CTC officer sent a cable to several Agency addressees reporting that the information and al-Mihdhar's travel documents had been passed to the FBI. The officer who drafted this cable does not recall how this information was passed. The Team has not been able to confirm that the information was passed, or that it was not passed. Whatever the case, the Team found no indication that anyone in CTC checked to ensure FBI receipt of the information, which, a few UBL Station officers said, should have been routine practice.
(S) Separately, in March 2000, two CIA field locations sent
to a number of addressees cables reporting that al-Hazmi and another al-Qa'ida
associate had traveled to the United States. They were clearly identified in the
cables as "UBL associates." The Team has found no evidence, and heard
no claim from any party, that this information was shared in any manner with the
FBI or that anyone in UBL . Station took other appropriate operational action at
that time.
(C) In the months following the Malaysia operation, the CIA
missed several additional opportunities to nominate al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar for
watchlisting; to inform the FBI about their intended or actual travel to the
United States; and to take appropriate operational action. These included a few
occasions identified by the Joint Inquiry as well as several others.
(C) The consequences of the failures to share information
and perform proper operational followthrough on these terrorists were
potentially significant. Earlier watchlisting of al-Mihdhar could have prevented
his re-entry into the United States in July 2001. Informing the FBI and good
operational followthrough by CIA and FBI might have resulted in surveillance of
both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. Surveillance, in turn, would have had the
potential to yield information on flight training, financing, and links to
others who were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.
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(S) The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review
the performance of
for failing to ensure that someone in the Station informed the FBI and
took appropriate operational action regarding al-Hazmi in March 2000. In
addition, the Team recommends that the Accountability Board assess the
performance of the latter three managers for failing to ensure prompt action
relevant to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during several later opportunities between
March 2000 and August 2001.
(U) Broader Information Sharing Issues. The Joint Inquiry charged that CIA's information-sharing problems derived from differences among agencies with respect to missions, legal authorities, and cultures. It argued that CIA efforts to protect sources and methods fostered a reluctance to share information and limited disclosures to criminal investigators. The report also alleged that most Agency officers did not focus sufficiently on the domestic terrorism front, viewing this as an FBI mission. The 9/11 Review Team's findings are similar in many respects, but the Team believes the systemic failures in this case do not lie in reluctance to share. Rather, the basic problems were poor implementation, guidance, and oversight of processes established to foster the exchange of information, including the detailee program.
(C) CTC and UBL Station had on their rosters detailees from
many different agencies, including the FBI, NSA, Federal Aviation Administration
, and State Department. The manner in which these detailees were managed left
many of them unclear about the nature of their responsibilities. Many CIA
managers and officers believed the detailees were responsible for conveying
information to their home agencies, while most of the detailees maintained that
they were working as CTC officers and had neither the time nor the
responsibility to serve as links to their home agencies. The Team found, at a
minimum, that there were fundamental ambiguities about the responsibilities of
the detailees as they related to information sharing, and that these
responsibilities were never delineated explicitly or in
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writing. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC during the years before 9/11 concerning their oversight of the Center's practices in management of the detailee program.
(U) See the Team's discussions of Factual Finding 5b (The Watchlisting Failure) and Systemic Findings 9 (Information Sharing Within the IC) and 10 (Information Sharing with Non-IC Members) for elaboration on these issues.
(U) Strategic Analysis
(S) The Team, like the JI , found that the IC's
understanding of al-Qa'ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus,
particularly regarding strategic analysis. The Team asked three individuals who
had served as senior intelligence analysts and managers to conduct an
independent review of the Agency's analytic products dealing with UBL and
al-Qa'ida for the period from 1998 to 2001 and assess their quality. They found
that, while CTC's tradecraft was generally good, important elements were
missing. Discussion of implications was generally weak, for example. Most
important, a number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at
all. The Team found:
- No comprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qa'ida by CTC or any other
component.
- No comprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993.
- No examination of the potential for terrorists to use aircraft as weapons,
as distinguished from traditional hijackings.
- Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential target.
- No comprehensive analysis that put into context the threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.
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That said, CTC's analytic component, the Assessments and Information Group (AIG), addressed aspects of these issues in several more narrowly focused strategic papers and other analytic products.
Off The personnel resources of AIG were heavily dedicated to policy-support
and operational-support activities. Analysts focused primarily on current and
tactical issues rather than on strategic analysis. In the two years prior to
9/11, the Directorate of Intelligence's
and others had raised with CTC managers the need to dedicate some
proportion of the analytic work force to strategic analysis, as was the practice
in many DI offices. In early 2001, the DCI specifically directed CTC to
establish a strategic analysis unit within AIG. The Chief of AIG had for some
time been aware of the need to strengthen the analytic work force and was
working to do so. The strategic analysis unit was formed in July 2001; as of
late July, it was manned by
analysts.
(S) The Team found that the National Intelligence
Council (MC) addressed the al-Qa'ida threat to only a limited extent. The NIC
produced a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat to the United
States in 1995 and an update in 1997. It did not produce a similar,
comprehensive assessment from that point until after 9/11, although preparation
of such a product was underway, with a CTC drafter, in the early months of 2001
and was being edited as of 9/11.
(U) See Team discussions of Factual Findings 2 (Signs of an Impending Attack), 3 (The Threat to the United States), and 4 (Aircraft as Weapons) and Systemic Finding 5 (Strategic Analysis) for further information on these topics.
(U) Operations (Unilateral and Liaison)
(S/ /NF) The Joint Inquiry charges that CIA did not
effectively develop and use human resources to penetrate al-Qa'ida's inner
circle, thus significantly limiting the IC's
xviii
ability to acquire actionable intelligence before 9/11. The report argues that this lack of sources resulted from an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services and walk-ins (sources who volunteer); a focus on disruption and capture rather than collection; and adherence to the dirty asset rules (guidelines that restricted the recruitment of sources who had committed certain proscribed acts).
The Review Team did not find that CIA's reliance on liaison for collection
was excessive but did find that this reliance was not balanced with a strong
focus on developing unilateral assets. The Team did not find that CIA reliance
on walk-ins was misguided
Although the CIA focused its al-Qa'ida
operations on Afghanistan, possibly limiting its ability to focus elsewhere, the Team believes that this approach was reasonable and that its purpose was collection on al-Qa'ida as well as disruption of al-Qa'ida's activities. While
agreeing that the dirty asset rules may have created a climate that had the
effect of inhibiting certain recruitment operations, the Team is unable to
confirm or determine the extent of the impact. Finally, the Team found that
several operational platforms
were not effectively engaged in the battle against al-Qa'ida. In the case
of this
reflected the weakness of the program itself. In the case
it reflected CTC's focus on Afghanistan and the priority of its attempts
to penetrate al-Qa'ida's inner circle.
(S/ /NF) The Team found that the CIA's relations with
foreign liaison services were critical to its ability to disrupt al-Qa'ida and
thwart some terrorist attacks on the United States. While the capabilities and
cooperation of liaison services were uneven, the program itself did not detract
from CIA's efforts to mount its own unilateral operations. The Team did raise
serious questions about whether CTC prior to 9/11 had made the most effective
use of liaison
services in its operations against al-Qa'ida.
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Nevertheless,
the Team observes that the complicated dynamics of liaison relationships,
including lack of common goals and counterintelligence problems, suggest that
CTC managers made reasonable judgments
(S/ /NF)The Joint Inquiry particularly criticized CIA
for the conduct of its operational relationship
It noted that CIA had unsuccessfully pressed
authorities for additional information on individuals later identified as
associates of some of the hijackers. It placed some of the blame for this on
CIA's decisions The
Team also found that CIA was unable to acquire the information cited by the JI
but found that it made repeated efforts to do so and that its lack of success
was the result of a difficult operating environment and limited cooperation on
the part of The
Team concluded that the decisions made with respect to were reasonable.
(S/ /NF) The Joint Inquiry also argued that both the
FBI and CIA had failed to identify the extent of support from Saudi nationals or
groups for terrorist activities globally or within the United States and the
extent to which such support, to the extent it existed, was knowing or
inadvertent. While most of the JI discussion on the Saudi issue dealt with
issues involving the FBI and its domestic operations, the report also
The Team found that a significant gap existed in the CIA's understanding
of Saudi extremists' involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The primary
reasons for this gap were the difficulty of the task, the hostile operational
environment, and
(S/ /NF) The Team also found, however, that UBL
Station and were
hostile to each other and working at cross purposes over a period of years
before 9/11. The Team cannot measure the specific impact of this
counterproductive behavior. At a minimum, however, the Team found that
organizational tensions clearly complicated
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and delayed the preparation of Agency approaches
thus negatively affecting the timely and effective functioning of the
exchange with on
terrorism issues.
(U) See the Team's discussions of Systemic Findings 11 (HUMINT Operations Against Al-Qa'ida) and 15 (Reliance on Foreign Liaison), Factual Finding 5h (The Hijackers' Associates in Germany), and Related Finding 20 (Issues Relating to Saudi Arabia) for additional information.
(U) Covert Action
(C) The Joint Inquiry charged that US policymakers had
wanted Usama Bin Ladin killed as early as August 1998 and believed CIA personnel
understood that. However, the government had not removed the ban on
assassination and did not provide clear direction or authorization for CIA to
kill Bin Ladin or make covert attacks against al-Qa'ida
The JI said that the CIA was reluctant to seek authority to assassinate
Bin Ladin and averse to taking advantage of ambiguities in the authorities it
did receive that might have allowed it more flexibility. The JI argued that
these factors shaped the type of covert action the CIA undertook against Bin
Ladin and that, before September 11, covert action had little impact on
aI-Qa'ida or Bin Ladin.
The
findings and conclusions of the Review Team correspond with most but not all of
the JI conclusions. The Team believes that the restrictions in the authorities
given the CIA with respect to Bin Ladin, while arguably, although ambiguously,
relaxed for a period of time in late 1998 and early 1999, limited the range of
permissible operations. Given the law, executive order, and past problems with
covert action programs, CIA managers refused to take advantage of the
ambiguities that did exist. The Team believes this position was reasonable and
correct. Ultimately, the Team concludes the failure of the Agency's covert
action against Bin Ladin lay not in the language and interpretation of its
authorities, but in the limitations of its covert action capabilities: CIA's
heavy reliance on a single
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group of assets, who were of questionable reliability and had limited capabilities, proved insufficient to mount a credible operation against Bin Ladin. Efforts to develop other options had limited potential prior to 9/11.
The
Joint Inquiry states that US military officials were reluctant to use military
assets to conduct operations in Afghanistan or to support or participate in CIA
operations against al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11. At least in part, this was a result
of the IC's inability to provide the necessary intelligence to support military
operations. The findings of the Team match those of the JI as they relate to the
CIA. The Agency was unable to satisfy the demands of the US military for the
precise, actionable intelligence that the military leadership required in order
to deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan or launch cruise missile
attacks against UBL-related sites beyond the August 1998 retaliatory strikes in
Afghanistan and Sudan. Differences between CIA and the Department of Defense
over the cost of replacing lost Predators also hampered collaboration over the
use of that platform in Afghanistan. The Team concludes, however, that other
impediments, including the slow-moving policy process, reduced the importance of
these CIA-military differences. The Team believes CIA handled its relationship
with the US military responsibly and within the bounds of what was reasonable
and possible.
The
Joint Inquiry charges that the CIA failed to attack UBL's finances and failed to
work cooperatively with the Department of the Treasury to develop leads and
establish links to other terrorist funding sources. The Team, likewise, found
that CIA failed to attack Bin Ladin's money successfully but finds that this was
not for lack of effort.
The Team also agrees that bureaucratic obstacles and legal restrictions
inhibited CIA's partnership with the Department of the Treasury.
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(U) See the Team's discussions of Systemic Findings 13 (Covert Action), 14 (Collaboration with the Military), and 16 (Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding) for more information on these issues.
(U) Technology
The
Joint Inquiry charged that technology had not been fully and effectively applied
in support of US counterterrorism efforts. The Team found that significant
differences existed between CIA and NSA over several critical issues. One of
these involved a dispute over which agency had authority
This dispute had not yet been resolved in September 2001. The second issue
involved NSA's unwillingness to share raw SIGINT transcripts with CIA; this made
it more difficult for CTC to perform its mission against al-Qa'ida. In the late
1990s, however, NSA managers offered to allow a CTC officer to be detailed to
NSA to cull the transcripts for useful information. CTC sent one officer to NSA
for a brief period of time in 2000, but failed to send others, citing resource
constraints. The Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the
performance of the Chiefs of CTC for their failure to detail officers to NSA on
a consistent, full-time basis to exploit this material in the years before 9/11.
(U) See the Team's discussions of Systemic Findings 4 (Application of Technology) and 7 (Computer Exploitation) for discussion of the technology issue.
xxiii
source: PDF (1.73 MB) 21aug2007
Director's
Statement on the
Release of the 9/11 IG Report Executive Summary
Statement to Employees by Director
of the
Central Intelligence Agency, General Michael V. Hayden
on the Release of the 9/11 IG Report Executive Summary
CIA Press Release 21aug2007
Earlier this month, Congress passed a bill implementing some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The legislation, lengthy and complex, includes a provision dealing with the report that CIA’s Office of Inspector General prepared on the performance of our agency prior to September 11th. The act gave me 30 days to make available to the public a version of the report’s executive summary, declassified to the maximum extent possible. Today, well within deadline, I am releasing that material.
While meeting the dictates of the law, I want to make it clear that this declassification was neither my choice nor my preference. Two Directors of National Intelligence have supported the agency’s position against release.
The long, grueling fight against terrorism, which depends in very real part on the quality of our intelligence, demands that we keep our focus on the present and the future. We must draw lessons from our past—and we have—without becoming captive to it. I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving their country on the frontlines of a global conflict. It will, at a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground that is already well plowed. I also remain deeply concerned about the chilling effect that may follow publication of the previously classified work, findings, and recommendations of the Office of Inspector General. The important work of that unit depends on candor and confidentiality.
In keeping with the letter and spirit of the law, CIA has in its declassification process removed relatively little from the report’s executive summary. We focused chiefly on the protection of essential sources and methods. I also thought it unnecessary and unwise to permit identification of officers below the level of Center Chief, even if only by title, and those passages have been deleted, as well.
There is some background that I believe you need to know. In 2002, the Joint Inquiry Committee of Congress instructed our Office of Inspector General to determine if any agency officers should be rewarded for outstanding service in the run-up to 9/11 or held accountable for the unsatisfactory discharge of their duties. In June 2005, the Inspector General presented my predecessor, Porter Goss, with a final report answering that specific mandate. The summary, like the complete report, is a very human document. In it, one group of agency officers—dedicated to their task—looks back to examine and judge the actions of another group of agency officers—dedicated to their task, the task of understanding and combating al-Qai’da.
You should also know that there are very different perspectives on this report. It was important for us to conduct our own review—that is something on which most, if not all of us, can agree. But our colleagues referred to in the document, and others who have read it, took strong exception to its focus, methodology, and conclusions. In October 2005, Director Goss declined to accept its primary recommendation—the creation of an Accountability Board to consider disciplinary action against a handful of individuals at different levels of command. I have re-read the report, carefully evaluated what it says, and have found no reason to revisit his decision.
Director Goss noted at the time that the officers cited include some of our finest. With inadequate resources, they and those they led worked flat out against a tough, secretive foe. As the executive summary points out, there was never a question of misconduct. While they, and our government as a whole, were unable despite their best efforts to shield our nation from attack, their skill, wisdom, energy, and leadership were key elements in the agency’s victories over al-Qai’da before and after 9/11. They have made powerful contributions to our national security. They have prevented other acts of terrorism, and they have saved innocent lives, in our country and overseas.
This is not about avoiding responsibility. In fact, the opposite is true. CIA has for years spoken publicly, openly, and explicitly about shortcomings in its counter-terror programs before 9/11. Those shortcomings have been the subject of hearings, studies, panels, press reports, books, and critiques of all kinds, some fair, some not. As you will see, the Inspector General found no “silver bullet” that would have prevented the terror attacks of September 11th. There was, in the words of the summary, “no single point of failure.”
Nor did CIA wait for this formal review to begin identifying and correcting the systemic flaws discussed in the report. This is an organization that is self-aware, self-critical, and, to a great degree, self-improving. The Inspector General’s report, like others before it, found areas in which CIA could do better, and, in the intervening years, we have worked hard to do just that.
Counter-terrorism is an exceptionally difficult challenge. The risks, and the stakes, are extremely high. The enemy is adaptive, resilient, and determined to strike us again here at home. There are limits to what intelligence can accomplish, and there can be no guarantee of perfect security. But the talented, motivated officers who work against this threat day and night give our nation a strong advantage. Together, we recognize that the finest tribute we can pay to the victims of terrorism is a redoubled effort to rip that scourge out by the roots. We can, and should, be proud of the many great things CIA has done, and will do, to defend the United States in a very dangerous world.
Mike Hayden
source: CIA website 22aug2007
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