America Wanted War 

MARTIN KETTLE / The Guardian Weekly 24jul03

Dodgy dossiers and proof of WMD are a sideshow
Blair backed Bush for one simple reason

The British people were indeed tricked into the Iraq war. But the trickery was not forensic. It was not really about intelligence dossiers, whether sexed up by Alastair Campbell or otherwise. It even had little to do with weapons of mass destruction, whether possessed or programmed by Iraq. The deception was always political. It concerned the true reasons why Britain went to war, stuck by America's side, abandoned its principal allies and interests in Europe, and played fast and loose with the United Nations. Like all deceptions, this was not admitted in public. But it was certainly discussed in private. And now it has been revealed. Ladies and gentlemen, it looks as if we have a smoking gun.

According to the slightly unreal argument that continues to bagatelle through parliament and the media, the key to war was proof. This international battle with Saddam Hussein is argued like a criminal trial. Prove that Saddam had - or might have had - weapons of mass destruction, and there would be a cause of war. Fail to prove it, tamper with the evidence, and the case for war falls. That is why the roles of the weapons inspectors and the intelligence services became so vital in the tussle for public opinion.

But in the real world this was all rather beside the point. Or, rather, it was all secondary. Hans Blix never held the decision to go to war in his hands at all. Nor did the intelligence chiefs. The struggle in the real world was about power and politics. This was not a trial. But it was punishment. And Tony Blair decided early on where he stood.

The evidence for this has been sitting unremarked in a book published at the start of this month. Peter Stothard's book, 30 Days, is an inside account of what the subtitle calls "a month at the heart of Blair's war". It is exceptionally well sourced. The former editor of the Times was given remarkable access to the inner workings of 10 Downing Street for the build-up and duration of the conflict in March and April. Stothard's account alters the evidence for the way that we should look at British policy towards the Iraq war.

Over the months many commentators have alleged that the war with Iraq occurred for one pre-eminent reason - because the United States wanted it. Clare Short recently said as much. But this claim has been laughed off by insiders. Now, though, Stothard has provided a compelling piece of evidence that the critics' charge was spot on.

The crucial passage occurs on page 87 of Stothard's diary-style narrative of the war. It comes as the author reflects on the political thought processes that had gone into the crafting of Blair's widely admired speech at the start of the vital eve-of-war Commons debate on March 18. Stothard's reflections are contained in a relatively long passage, but it deserves to be quoted in full:

"Has Tony Blair become some sort of reckless crusader over Iraq? He thinks not. In September 2002 his analysis of relations between Washington, London and Baghdad was clear and cold. It rested on six essential points to which he and his aides would regularly return:

1. Saddam Hussein's past aggression, present support for terrorism and future ambitions made him a clear threat to his enemies. He was not the only threat, but he was a threat nevertheless.
2. The US and Britain were among his enemies.
3. The people of the US, still angered by the September 11 attacks, still sensing unfinished business from the first Gulf war 12 years before, would support a war on Iraq.
4. Gulf war 2 - President George W Bush v Saddam Hussein - would happen whatever anyone else said or did.
5. The people of Britain, continental Europe and most of the rest of the world would not even begin to support a war unless they had a say in it through the UN.
6. It would be more damaging to long-term world peace and security if the Americans alone defeated Saddam Hussein than if they had international support to do so.

"These six points - when scribbled on the back of an envelope or set out on a printed page - are not exceptional. What is exceptional is the certainty required to follow their logic. It is Tony Blair's certainty that has been the surprise for many Labour MPs."

The six points are exceptionally important. First, because of the date. Second, because of the clear implication that Blair is the source of them. And third, because it shows how passive British policy really was. Britain did not go to war to overthrow an evil regime, or even to control WMD. It went to war to keep on the right side of Washington.

It has long been clear that September 2002 was pivotal. It was the month when American decision-making reached ramming speed. It was when the real decisions were taken - taken before Bush went to the UN, before the UN authorised fresh weapons inspections, and before the government's first dossier on Iraq's WMD. All of these were simply efforts to sell a fait accompli.

The two most important of the points are the fourth and the sixth. They tell us, with great clarity, that in September 2002 Blair acknowledged that the US would go to war in Iraq "whatever anyone else said or did". They tell us, too, that Blair believed that Britain should go to war alongside the US, whatever anyone else said or did.

Weigh those two points carefully. Neither of them has ever been heard publicly in the mouth of a British minister or adviser until now. Yet these points, apparently attributed by Stothard to Blair in September 2002, transform all accounts of the government's approach.

Not everything about the six points is shocking. It is not a bolt from the blue to conclude, as Blair did in point four, that the US would go to war whatever anyone else said or did. Bush came extremely close to saying it in the 2002 state of the union. But it is a revelation to have Blair admit it, and then for him to add that it was in the interests of "long-term peace and security" for others - ie Britain - to do the same, whatever the circumstances.

As Blair admits in point five, the British public would only support a war if it was authorised by the UN. But Blair's reaction was dictated by points four and six, not by the logic of the failure of point five.

The policy was always to make the best of a bad job. Blair continues to make the best of it. But it is still a bad job. And now we appear to have proof that Blair knew this all along.