Offensive New Pentagon Defence Doctrine

Making Enemies 

PAUL-MARIE DE LA GORCE Le Monde Diplomatique Mar02

The United States military seems to be preparing for an attack on Iraq, its plans based on a new Washington defence doctrine and even newer hi-tech weaponry. The Pentagon is gathering its resources to declare pre-emptive war in the name of American national self-defence.

Paul Marie de la Gorce s latest book is `Le dernier empire : le XXie siecle sera-t-il americain?', Grasset, Paris, 1996

THE United States secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, announced a big shift in the nation's military strategy early this year. The new objective was to be deterrence in four critical theatres, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time, while preserving the option for one massive counter-offensive to occupy an aggressor's capital and replace the regime" (l).

Before this announcement, US defence policy had gone through three phases. Until the early 1970s, when communist regimes were seen as a single bloc, it was based on a two-and-a-half conflicts scenario. Preparations were made for simultaneous wars with the Soviet Union and China, plus a regional conflict against an enemy with a much smaller military capability. The Korean war, Vietnam war and interventions in Lebanon, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic were all in the half-conflict category.

The second phase began after the rift between the Soviet Union and China, when President Nixon adopted a one-and-a half conflict strategy, retaining the means to fight a major war with either of the big powers at the same time as a limited regional conflict.

The third phase started immediately after the end of the cold war. In the Base Force Review published in 1991, the Bush Stir administration announced an approach based on two major regional conflicts. This was confirmed by the Clinton administration in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and again in the 1997 Quadrennial Defence Review, where such conflicts were renamed major theatre wars (2).

Rumsfeld, who was speaking to students at the National Defence University in Washington in January, did not only extend the prospects of conflict from two to four major theatres. Attempting a closer definition of the threats against the US, he grouped in the enemy camp terrorist organisations with global ambitions and states supporting them said to be developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. "The real concern", he said, "is the nexus between terrorist networks and terrorist states that have weapons of mass destruction." Threats were now defined both by their source and by their nature. "We need to prepare for new forms of terrorism and also attacks on US space assets, cyber attacks on our information networks, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons."

Paving the way for a considerable increase in US defence expenditure, Rumsfeld listed six transformational goals of the new strategy: to protect America, and US bases overseas; to protect and sustain power in distant theatres; to deny enemies sanctuary; to protect US information networks from attack; to use information technology to link US forces for effective combined operations; to maintain unhindered access to space and protect US space capabilities.

These far-reaching changes do not affect current doctrine on the deployment of forces, which continues to be based on the revolution in military affairs (RMA) (3) and focuses on the use of high-precision long-range weapons and on permanent information concerning potential targets and the deployment of enemy forces. RMA technology has led to the adoption of strategic control as the central concept of American policy; that means the ability to monitor the enemy permanently, sap his strength by strikes on military, industrial and political targets, and if necessary destroy his military, industrial and political potential to force him to retreat or capitulate. US strategists have consistently maintained that this doctrine was conceived as a response to all types of conflict. How it is applied depends on the nature of the enemy -population, industrial potential, infrastructure, size of cities. Above all, it depends on the political regime and what is required to overthrow or neutralise it. There is considerable room for pragmatism. No wonder US experts and their think-tank consultants have being looking closely at the way the doctrine was applied during the Gulf war, and in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The US air offensive against Iraq in 1991 lasted 43 days. It was followed by only four days of ground operations. In 1994, when ground operations in Bosnia were delegated to Washington's allies, US bombers hit 300 targets at the cost of two planes lost and two American casualties. In Kosovo the US air offensive lasted 78 days. It proved effective only against civilian targets in Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, without any loss of American life. The Pentagon admitted only the loss of one F117 stealth fighter and a dozen drones. Experts investigating the strategic control concept agree that air strikes against the Yugoslavian armed forces were a failure, destroying only 12 or 13 enemy tanks. These figures tally with those of the Yugoslavian high command. They are a long way from the triumphant claims made by NATO during the war. Yet the experts argue that US air strikes have become more effective.

The doctrine was applied in Afghanistan, where it was adapted to the terrain and deployment of enemy forces. As long as priority was given to building a political force capable of replacing the Taliban, US air strikes were directed against enemy airfields, tanks, hardware concentrations and munitions dumps. They were backed by cruise missiles fired from planes or warships. When the objective shifted to the occupation of territory by the Northern Alliance, and subsequently by local Pashtun militias, the US switched to blanket bombing. This enabled its proxy ground forces to advance with the help of a few US special units and without large-scale engagements. Both Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul fell without major battles, although this did not prevent massacres. In Kandahar, where the Taliban had dispersed forces, the strategy was to obliterate the city from the air. The death toll has not been published. In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo, US authorities believe their concept is being applied, with variations, effectively enough for them to achieve most of their political objectives with negligible losses.

The US strategists and their supporters frankly admit the link between strategic control and the current plans for anti-missile defence. They invoke the supposed threat from states that have a limited military potential but possess medium and long-range missiles capable of reaching US territory (4). They argue that American aerospace power rests on the invulnerability of US territory, since anti-missile defence systems abroad or at sea can at best serve as a back-up.

The correlation between strategic control and anti-missile defence turns out to be more decisive than official explanations have you believe. The anti-missile defence project, now renamed the Missile Defense System (MDS), was originally heavily criticised. But US determination to push ahead overcame all opposition, even when the Bush administration announced its intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty, and even when the US successfully launched an antimissile missile test from a surface vessel in defiance of the requirement for six months, notice.

The MDS was the outcome of a strategic analysis based on absolute US superiority in all areas of defence. The strategists (members of the Rumsfeld commission and the Secretary of State, Colin Powell) concluded that the US need no longer be bound by the concept of mutual deterrence and nuclear parity that had prevailed during the cold war. The objective should be to reduce nuclear arsenals as far as possible while Russia and the US kept their nuclear deterrents, since they no longer had any interest in attacking each other or any intention to do so. It followed that America, plus areas on the territory of US allies considered to be of vital interest, and US air and naval bases abroad, had to be protected by an anti-missile system.

But protected. against whom? Some of the strategists argued that the potential enemy whose offensive capability would be neutralised by an anti-missile barrier could be a rogue state stigmatised by US diplomacy. Others had no doubt the enemy was China. That debate has now run its course. Both rogue states and China are accepted as potential threats in the US, although the former are now referred to as "states involved in developing weapons of mass destruction". China is unambiguously designated as a peer competitor and possible adversary in the Joint Vision 2020 military analysis of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (a low-key version of this analysis was published in 2000).

Clearly the first zone beyond US borders to be protected by the MDS would be Taiwan, to prevent China seizing control of the island. The US air and air-ground bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which Rumsfeld says are there to stay, would also be protected. To retain credibility, China would have to respond by increasing the number and performance of its missiles well beyond the current level. According to reliable US sources, it could within 12 years have more than 100 mobile ground-to-ground missiles fitted with nuclear warheads capable of reaching the US. Being mobile, they would be invulnerable to pre-emptive strikes (5).

The potential enemy could also be one of the states in the axis of evil that President Bush referred to: Korea, Iran and Iraq. Yet none of these appears to have had relations with the terrorist organisation responsible for the attacks on 11 September. Nor do they possess weapons of mass destruction, since those Iraq was developing have now been dismantled.

The new strategy envisages the use of conventional forces against these three states. For each, scenarios are being studied. In Iraq it is already clear that an air offensive would not be launched unless the US was certain of local ground support. The aim would be a full-scale combined operation designed to end only with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The geographical, demographic, economic and military dimensions of Iran make conventional war against it unlikely. The scenarios for Iran range from a partial blockade to strikes against industrial and military installations supposedly manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. But a blockade against Iran would require the creation of a disciplined coalition, which would not be easy. And nothing would prevent reactions and counter-reactions escalating out of control.

That North Korea has China as its neighbour restricts the possibilities for air or air-ground operations there, although US strategists do not rule them out. They are also considering negotiating agreements with the North Korean government to restrict the production, development and export of missiles, similar to past agreements concerning nuclear weapons.

The new US defence budget is sufficient proof that the Bush administration is determined to prepare for the full range of possible conflicts with these countries. Military expenditure was already on the increase towards the end of the Clinton administration. It rose from $259bn in 1998 to $279bn in 1999, $290bn in 2000 and $3016n for 2000-2001(6). While the new budget does not signal a general upsurge, the pace has accelerated: from $328bn for 2001-2002 to $379bn for the following year. By 2007 it could be $450bn. Under the impact of the September attacks some defence budgets have increased hugely. Funding for measures to combat biological terrorism has almost doubled, from $1.4bn to $3.7bn (7). The lesson is clear. The US administration has announced that the use of force is a necessary and legitimate means of achieving its aims. It is now gathering its resources.

Translated by Barry Smerin

(1) See "Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on 21st Century Transformation 0f U.S. Armed Forces", US Department of Defence, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002

(2) On these developments, see Michael T Klare, "A new military strategy for Washington?", Le Monde diplomatique English edition, November 1997, and Paul-Marie de La Gorce, "Washington triggers new arms race", Le Monde diplomatique English edition, December 1999.

(3) RMA describes the impact of new military technologies and information warfare 0n the conduct of operations from the tactical t0 the strategic level. Key RMA technologies include precision-guided munitions, stealth technology and space-based assets for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as modern computer capabilities to integrate these functions. See Maurice Najman, "Developing the weapons of the 21st century", Le Monde diplomatique English edition, February 1998.

(4) Admiral Marcel Duval, "Le projet de bouclier anti-missilesaméricain", Géopolitique, Paris, no 7, January-March 2002.

(5) See Intelligence et Sécurité, Paris, January 2002.

(6) Office Of Management and Budget, Congressional Budget Office.

(7) Judith Miller, "Bush to request big spending push on bioterrorism", New York Times, 4 February 2002.