DRUG CONTROL
Efforts to Develop
Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops
in Colombia
Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles
United States General Accounting Office GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters GAO-02-291 8feb02
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
February 8, 2002
The Honorable Jesse A. Helms
Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Foreign Relations
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Co-Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control
The Honorable Mike DeWine
United States Senate
The United States has been providing counternarcotics assistance to countries in the Andean region since the early 1970s to help curb the supply of illicit drugs—primarily cocaine—entering the United States. As part of these efforts, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided assistance to help Bolivian and Peruvian growers of illicit crops find legal means of earning a living. In recent years, these activities—termed alternative development1—together with U.S.- supported interdiction and eradication programs have greatly reduced the amount of coca2 grown in Bolivia and Peru. Meanwhile, coca cultivation and cocaine production have increased substantially in Colombia, making it the world’s leader in both.
Recognizing the seriousness of illegal drug activities in Colombia, the Colombian government, in October 1999, announced a $7.5 billion counternarcotics plan known as Plan Colombia.3 Among other things, Plan Colombia proposed to reduce the cultivation of coca and the processing and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent over 6 years. To assist in this effort, in July 2000, the United States committed to providing about $1.3 billion to Colombia, other Andean countries, and U.S. agencies involved in drug interdiction and law enforcement, part of which was intended for alternative development.4 More recently, in January 2002, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative was passed, which provides $625 million for counternarcotics programs, including alternative development, in Andean countries.5
Although coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru has been reduced in recent years,6 you expressed concern about whether the alternative development program in Colombia will achieve its objectives and contribute to reducing the production of illicit drugs there. Specifically, you asked that we determine (1) what lessons have been learned in providing alternative development assistance to Bolivia and Peru, especially any that may apply to Colombia; (2) what progress USAID has made with alternative development in Colombia; and (3) what obstacles must be overcome to facilitate alternative development in Colombia. To review the programs in Bolivia and Peru and the status of efforts and challenges in Colombia, we analyzed program documentation and met with cognizant U.S., host government, contractor, and nongovernmental organization officials in Washington, D.C.; Bolivia; Colombia; and Peru. To gain a firsthand view of program activities in Bolivia and Peru, we visited selected project sites and met with project beneficiaries in both countries.
Results in Brief
Taken together, the lessons learned in Bolivia and Peru indicate that effective alternative development demands a strong host government commitment to a comprehensive array of counternarcotics measures and years of sustained U.S. assistance to support them. Chief among the specific lessons for Colombia are that progress requires host government control of drug-growing areas and an enduring political will to interdict drug trafficking and forcibly eradicate illicit crops as well as a carefully coordinated approach to executing these efforts. A lack of government control of project sites hampers access to beneficiaries; prevents monitoring for compliance with eradication agreements; and discourages commercial activity, investment, and public support. Without effective interdiction and eradication, illicit drug producers do not have the incentive to engage in legal economic activities. Poor coordination of alternative development, interdiction, and eradication activities limits the mutually reinforcing benefits of these actions.
Alternative development efforts are at an early stage in Colombia. USAID began targeting Colombia’s poppy-growing areas in 2000 and expanded its program to include coca-growing areas in 2001. Project activities in both areas have been limited to date, and most will not begin in earnest until 2002. As of September 30, 2001, USAID had spent only $5.6 million on alternative development programs in Colombia out of the $52.5 million provided for this purpose through fiscal year 2001. By September 30, 2002, USAID expects cumulative expenditures on alternative development activities in Colombia to total about $31.8 million, or about 61 percent of the funds currently available. Additional funds are provided for in the fiscal year 2002 Foreign Operations appropriation bill.
USAID faces serious obstacles to achieving progress in Colombia, and the experiences in Bolivia and Peru strongly suggest that alternative development in Colombia will not succeed unless the obstacles are overcome. Among them, the Colombian government does not control many coca-growing areas, it has limited capacity to carry out sustained interdiction operations, and its ability to effectively coordinate eradication and alternative development activities remains uncertain.
Because of these serious obstacles, we are recommending that the USAID administrator update USAID’s alternative development project plans and spending proposals for Colombia to take into account extreme difficulty in gaining access to the coca-growing regions. We also suggest that the Congress consider requiring that USAID demonstrate measurable progress in its current efforts to reduce coca cultivation in Colombia before any additional funding is provided for alternative development.
In commenting on a draft of this report, USAID and State generally concurred with the report’s observations and conclusions regarding the obstacles facing alternative development efforts in Colombia. USAID also generally concurred with our recommendation to the administrator and noted that it has initiated such a review.
Background
Historically, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru have been major drug-producing countries. Together, they account for most of the coca cultivated worldwide and for the opium poppy used to produce most of the heroin seized on the east coast of the United States. Figure 1 shows the areas in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru where illicit drug crops are grown.
Figure 1: Illicit Drug Crop Areas in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru
Source: Latin American Narcotics Cultivation and Production Estimates 2000, U.S. government, p. 4.
The United States has supported counternarcotics efforts in Bolivia and Peru for nearly 30 years. USAID has implemented a series of alternative development projects in the coca-producing regions of these countries,7 while the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement have supported interdiction and voluntary and forced coca eradication programs. Due at least in part to these efforts, substantial reductions in coca cultivation were achieved in Bolivia and Peru during the mid-to-late 1990s. However, over the same period, coca cultivation in Colombia increased substantially, offsetting much of the decreases in Bolivia and Peru (see table 1).
Host Government Commitment and Sustained U.S. Assistance
Alternative development progress in Bolivia and Peru has required a lasting host government commitment to a broader set of counternarcotics measures and years of sustained U.S. assistance to support these efforts. More specifically, our analysis of project documentation, site visits, and discussions with U.S. and host government officials and project staff indicated that government control of drug-growing areas and project sites is essential for providing access to the targeted beneficiaries as well as security for project-related trade, commercial activity, and investment. It also enables the monitoring of compliance with voluntary eradication agreements. To promote and sustain coca cultivation reductions, the host government must have a strong commitment to carry out effective interdiction and eradication policies.8 Without interdiction and eradication as disincentives, growers are unlikely to abandon more lucrative and easily cultivated coca crops in favor of less profitable and harder to grow licit crops or to pursue legal employment. Further, alternative development, interdiction, and eradication efforts must be carefully coordinated to achieve mutually reinforcing benefits.
Table 2 summarizes several of the key lessons learned in Bolivia and Peru. Descriptions of the programs in Bolivia and Peru and more detailed discussions of the lessons learned from them are in appendixes I and II, respectively.
Table 1: Net Hectares of Coca Under Cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru (Calendar Years 1996-2000)
Percentage Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 change Bolivia 48,100 45,800 38,000 21,800 14,600 -70% Colombia 67,200 79,500 101,800 122,500 136,200 103% Peru 94,400 68,800 51,000 38,700 34,200 -64% Total 209,700 194,100 190,800 183,000 185,000 -12%
Source: Latin American Narcotics Cultivation and Production Estimates 2000, U.S. government, p. 5.
Table 2: Lessons Learned in Bolivia and Peru
Lesson Bolivia Peru
Government needs to USAID’s Chapare Regional Development USAID’s Upper Huallaga Area Development
control project sites. Project achieved little when the Project had very limited impact in the
Bolivian government lost control of groups such as the Shining Path caused
the project area to narcotics traffickers program staff and local residents to flee
in 1983. After the government the project site. Successful Peruvian
reestablished its presence in 1986, government anti-insurgency efforts enabled
progress improved. project activities to resume in the early
1990s.
Strong government Coca producer participation in USAID’s Coca grower participation in USAID’s
commitment facilitates Counternarcotics Consolidation of Alternative Development Project greatly
alternative development. Alternative Development Efforts Project increased in the mid-1990s due to the
increased substantially as a result of Peruvian government’s policy of shooting
the Bolivian government’s forced manual down airplanes thought to be involved
eradication of nearly all the coca from in narcotics trafficking.
Bolivia’s Chapare region in 1998 and
1999.
Alternative development, Poor coordination between U.S.-supported Poor coordination between U.S.-supported
interdiction, and eradication efforts and USAID’s eradication efforts and USAID’s Upper
eradication need to be Counternarcotics Consolidation of Huallaga Area Development Project led farmers
coordinated. Alternative Development Efforts Project to seek terrorists’ “protection.” In 2000,
in 1998 and 1999 created assistance gaps poor coordination between eradication and
in Bolivia—the eradication outpaced the USAID’s Alternative Development Project
assistance, leaving peasant farmers with provoked farmers to resent the project, which
bare fields and no immediate source of they associated with eradication. In 2000,
income. In 2000, USAID accelerated its USAID designed a “safety net” assistance
alternative development activities to program and began closely coordinating with
help close the gap and began making U.S. embassy staff to ensure that emergency
available emergency food assistance to food and other assistance would be provided
cushion the loss of income resulting growers whose crops are eradicated.
Monitoring compliance Community self-policing of compliance with In 2001, State’s inspector general found
with voluntary eradication agreements in the Chapare that monitoring efforts in Peru were not
eradication agreements region was not effective. In 1999, the specific enough to adequately link
is necessary. Bolivian government determined that 65 investments in alternative development
percent of the communities participating with coca reductions. U.S. embassy
in the voluntary eradication program had officials are currently designing a system to
broken their agreements and were better monitor eradication in specific areas.
disqualified from receiving assistance.
Markets are needed. Since 1991, USAID’s Cochabamba Regional Cultivating commercially viable crops under
Development and Counternarcotics USAID’s current Alternative Development Project
Consolidation of Alternative Development benefited Peruvian farmers after an early project
Efforts Project helped expand export failed to fully consider marketability. Further
markets and cultivate an adequate volume diversification is intended to improve food
of export-quality produce, substantially security for beneficiaries and stabilize their
increasing the volume and value of legal incomes, helping offset historically low prices
crops produced in the Chapare. for project-supported crops in recent years.
Public support is U.S. and Bolivian public relations efforts Terrorism and violence in Peru in the 1990s
helpful. throughout the 1990s helped build a public helped convince many Peruvians that coca
consensus in Bolivia that the production cultivation and narcotics trafficking were
of coca and cocaine—once thought to be an linked with the violence, helping create public
American problem—was a matter of Bolivian support for eradication, interdiction, and
national and economic interest, alternative development efforts.
facilitating public support for forced
eradication and alternative development
efforts.
Source: GAO analysis.
Alternative development progress in Bolivia and Peru has required years of sustained U.S. assistance. The United States has supported alternative development projects in these countries for two decades. Together with current and planned alternative projects in Bolivia and Peru, U.S. contributions to these programs total about $455 million. Other U.S. agencies have supported interdiction and eradication efforts in Bolivia and Peru for an even longer period—nearly three decades. In combination, these programs have helped achieve reductions in the amount of coca grown in these countries. Nonetheless, the host government agencies involved in these efforts continue to depend heavily on U.S. support. For example, according to USAID officials, the United States currently finances and indirectly oversees most of the Bolivian government’s alternative development agencies in the Chapare region because the Bolivian government does not have the resources to do so on its own. Similarly, the United States provides 60 to 70 percent of the total funding for the Peruvian alternative development agency, and USAID officials said that the Peruvian government would not be able to fund the agency’s activities without U.S. support. Table 3 shows past and current U.S. funding for alternative development programs in Bolivia and Peru.
Table 3: U.S. Support for Alternative Development Programs in Bolivia and Peru
Dollars in millions
Prior Current Country programs a programs b,c Total Bolivia $117 $112 $229 Peru 31 195 $226 Total $148 $307 $455 aPrior programs in Bolivia and Peru spanned 1983-98 and 1981-94, respectively. bThe current programs in Bolivia and Peru began in 1997 and 1995, respectively. cCurrent program figures are estimates. Source: USAID.
USAID Alternative Development Program in Colombia Is at an Early Stage
Alternative development efforts in Colombia are still at an early stage, and USAID will have difficulty spending all of the funds available for these activities. Initial USAID efforts in Colombia began in 2000 by focusing on promoting poppy eradication and strengthening the Colombian government’s alternative development institution (PNDA).9 USAID’s current program emphasizes alternative development efforts in the coca-growing regions of southern Colombia to complement other U.S.-supported counternarcotics activities there. Alternative development activities in both poppy-and coca-growing areas are just beginning. As of September 30, 2001, USAID had spent only about $5.6 million, or 11 percent, of the $52.5 million currently available. By September 30, 2002, USAID expects its cumulative actual expenditures to reach $31.8 million, or 61 percent, of the total available in fiscal year 2001.
As part of its initial effort to support the eradication of 3,000 hectares of poppy by the end of 2002,10 USAID awarded a $10 million contract to Chemonics International, Inc., in June 2000. Chemonics’ role was to assist PNDA in implementing poppy-related alternative development activities by promoting crop substitution, environmental improvements, and other development efforts in the poppy-growing regions of Cauca, Huila, Tolima, and Narino.11
After funding for Plan Colombia was approved in July 2000, USAID began planning for alternative development in Colombia’s coca-growing areas. These efforts were intended to complement the eradication and interdiction components of Plan Colombia’s first phase—the “push” into the Putumayo and Caqueta departments of southern Colombia where coca cultivation is most heavily concentrated. To quickly launch these efforts, USAID reallocated $1 million of the $10 million originally intended to support poppy eradication to fund projects aimed at strengthening PNDA’s capacity to expand its activities in coca-growing areas. USAID’s projects targeted PNDA’s information technology, financial accountability, telecommunications systems, and public relations capabilities for improvement.
In April 2001, using Plan Colombia funds, USAID awarded an $87.5 million,12 5-year contract to Chemonics to oversee, administer, and carry out alternative development activities in the coca-growing areas in the Putumayo and Caqueta departments. To date, USAID has programmed $42.5 million of this amount. Though it will work collaboratively in reviewing and approving alternative development projects, USAID (through Chemonics) will fund some projects and PNDA plans to fund others. In addition, USAID and Chemonics continue to support poppy eradication and institutional strengthening of PNDA.
The overall alternative development approach in Colombia entails reaching agreements with communities to voluntarily eradicate illicit crops in exchange for help finding other income-producing opportunities and other assistance. The program is intended to provide incentives for small farmers (with 3 hectares or less of coca) to voluntarily eradicate their coca plants. In negotiating the community pacts, PNDA representatives met with groups of small farmers to obtain their commitment to voluntarily eradicate the illicit crops. After an eradication pact was signed, PNDA planned to provide the farmers with food crop seeds and plants or other immediate assistance. Once this assistance began, farmers were obliged to eradicate their illicit crops within 1 year.
According to USAID officials, Colombian government officials recently stated that most of the coca cultivation covered by the pacts already agreed to should be voluntarily eradicated by the end of July 2002.
As eradication progresses, farmers are to receive more comprehensive assistance from USAID. Initial efforts are focused on municipalities in the Putumayo, where USAID plans to support crop substitution and other income-generating activities by providing agricultural incentives, modern production and processing expertise, and credit and marketing assistance. USAID also plans to support environmental improvements through tree-growing programs in remote indigenous and tropical areas and training in pest control, forest management, and other areas. In addition, USAID plans to improve the social infrastructure in project areas by enhancing access to schools, health services, potable water, sewerage, and electricity.
In August 2001, USAID reported that its goal is the voluntary eradication of 11,500 hectares of coca grown on small farms by the end of 2002, with the aim of eliminating a total of 30,000 hectares by 2005. USAID also reported that approximately 33 community eradication pacts had been signed, which covered more than 37,000 hectares of coca in the Putumayo department.13 In its initial design plan, USAID also noted that sustainability will be measured in terms of permanent eradication of coca and the number of farm families permanently engaged in licit productive activities and not returning to coca cultivation.14
USAID alternative development project activities have been limited to date, and the pace is not expected to quicken significantly until 2002. As illustrated in table 4, of the $10 million originally programmed to support poppy eradication and institutional strengthening of PNDA, USAID’s actual expenditures were only about $1.3 million, or 13 percent, as of September 30, 2001. Of the $42.5 million programmed from Plan Colombia funding, USAID’s actual expenditures were only about $4.4 million, or 10 percent, as of the same date. Combined, actual expenditures were about $5.6 million, or about 11 percent, of the $52.5 million in total available program funds. USAID officials told us that they expect project activity to accelerate in 2002. They estimate that cumulative actual expenditures in 2002 will total about $31.8 million.
Table 4: Summary of USAID Projects in Colombia as of September 30, 2001
Dollars in thousands
Projects planned Projects approved
Funds Actual
Project emphasis programmeda Number Value Number Value expendituresa, b
Initial poppy program (pre-Plan Colombia)
Crop substitution $7,836 3 $430 3 $430 $521
and income generation
Environmental 873 0 0 0 0 0
improvements
Institutional 1,291 2 1,454 2 1,454 749
strengthening c
Subtotal $10,000 5 $1,884 5 $1,884 $1,270
(As a percentage
of funds programmed) (18.9%) (18.9%) (12.7%)
Expanded coca and poppy program (Plan Colombia)
Crop substitution and $34,598 32 8,617 17 3,808
income generation
(Coca) (13) (3,099) (13) (3,099)
(Poppy) (19) (5,518) (4) (709)
Environmental 2,482 8 423 6 343 225
improvements
Institutional 2,825 20 2,032 15 1,376 1,161
strengthening c
Social infrastructure 2,595 1 69 1 69 50
development
Subtotal $42,500 61 $11,141 39 $5,596 $4,350
(As a percentage
of funds programmed) (26.5%) (13.3) (10.3%)
Total $52,500 66 $12,025 44 $7,480 $5,620
(As a percentage (22.9%) (12.3%) (10.7%)
of funds programmed)
a Figures include USAID management and contractor administrative costs.
b According to USAID officials, actual expenditures do not fully reflect
progress since some subgrantees have begun activities but have not
presented vouchers to USAID.
c To date, most institutional strengthening projects have focused on PNDA;
however, these figures also include some institutional strengthening
projects aimed at local community organizations.
Source: USAID.
While USAID expects increased project activities in 2002, these activities will continue to be limited when viewed in the context of the total funding that is likely to be available for them. The administration had requested an additional $60.5 million for such activities in fiscal year 2002, but the Congress reduced the overall administration request for its Andean Counternarcotics Initiative from $731 million to $625 million, a reduction that will likely result in less funding for alternative development. As noted, USAID officials expect cumulative actual expenditures for alternative development activities in Colombia to total about $31.8 million by September 30, 2002—about 61 percent of the amount appropriated through fiscal year 2001.
Alternative Development in Colombia Faces Significant Obstacles to Success
USAID faces a number of serious challenges in implementing a successful alternative development program in Colombia. USAID planning documents for Colombia acknowledge specific lessons learned in Bolivia and Peru and note that overcoming obstacles in Colombia will require long-term U.S. and Colombian commitments. The experiences in Bolivia and Peru demonstrate the need for
• host government control and security in project areas;
• effective interdiction operations; and
• careful coordination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative
development efforts.
However, the Colombian government does not control large parts of the coca-growing areas, limiting its ability to carry out sustained interdiction operations, and the Colombian government’s ability to effectively coordinate eradication and alternative development activities remains uncertain.
Apart from these challenges, Colombia faces additional obstacles in implementing the alternative development program. Colombia has not devised a means to verify or ensure compliance by farmers participating in voluntary eradication programs, PNDA is weak and its funding for alternative development projects is not ensured, and project sites are in remote coca-growing areas where the soil quality and infrastructure are poor.
Experiences in Bolivia and Peru Point to Obstacles in Colombia
The experiences in Bolivia and Peru indicate that the most critical obstacle Colombia faces is that the government does not control large parts of the Putumayo and Caqueta departments in southern Colombia where much of the coca is grown. This lack of security will seriously hamper PNDA’s ability to develop the region’s infrastructure, establish viable and reliable markets for licit products, and attract the private investment needed for long-term, income-generating development. Without government control of project sites, narcotics traffickers and guerrilla forces will continue to profit from illicit drug operations and impede legal economic activities generated by alternative development programs.
USAID officials told us that armed groups have already intimidated some farmers and municipal leaders cooperating with the Colombian government. More recently, in September 2001, four employees of Colombian nongovernmental organizations working with PNDA in the Putumayo were kidnapped. According to USAID officials, two are confirmed murdered and the other two were released. As a result of these incidents, a number of nongovernmental organizations working with PNDA temporarily suspended their activities in the Putumayo in October 2001.
While Colombia uses aerial spray operations to carry out an active eradication program, the government’s lack of control over many coca-growing areas limits its ability to carry out sustained ground-based interdiction operations—an essential component of the successful efforts in Bolivia and Peru. Colombian military and law enforcement units destroy some cocaine laboratories and seize narcotics and precursor chemicals during individual counternarcotics operations; however, they lack sufficient forces to maintain the permanent presence to sustain such operations on a day-to-day basis. Further complicating the problem is that a large land area ceded to one of the guerilla groups is off limits to U.S. and Colombian agencies, but is reportedly an increasing source of coca and precursor supplies.15 Throughout these areas, insurgents and paramilitaries operate largely with impunity. The experiences in Bolivia and Peru showed that sustained interdiction operations are necessary to disrupt coca markets and thus produce declines in the prices of coca. Without these declines, alternative development efforts are not as effective.
The Colombian government’s ability to effectively coordinate eradication and alternative development activities remains uncertain. Careful coordination of these efforts was critical to their effectiveness in Bolivia and Peru. In December and February 2000, while conducting aerial eradication operations, the Colombian National Police accidentally sprayed approximately 600 to 700 hectares of an area where communities were negotiating pacts for participation in alternative development. Also, PNDA officials told us that eradication authorities had sprayed most of the Bolivar department, even though PNDA had targeted some communities in the department for participation in the alternative development program. This will likely complicate PNDA’s relations with farmers in that region. According to USAID officials, PNDA representatives currently coordinate with the Colombian National Police by indicating on a map or from an airplane the areas in the Putumayo and Caqueta departments that are in the alternative development program and should not be sprayed.16
Colombia Faces Additional Obstacles
Among the additional obstacles facing Colombia is the difficulty of verifying compliance with voluntary eradication pacts. The Colombian government has not determined how it will do so, and thus the reliability of the voluntary eradication pacts is uncertain. PNDA officials predict that it will be problematic and expensive to monitor compliance—a task complicated by the Colombian government’s lack of control over project sites. Until a means of verifying compliance is devised, compliance will depend upon peer pressure within a given community to prevent individuals from breaking the community’s eradication agreement with the government.
Weak host-country institutions pose an additional problem in Colombia. USAID originally intended to work through the Colombian International Cooperation Agency as a host-country contracting agency for its alternative development projects. However, USAID officials told us they did not have confidence that the Colombian agency could account for the assistance in accordance with USAID requirements. USAID chose instead to contract with Chemonics to manage program resources, including procuring goods and services and awarding and managing grants. Chemonics is working on a day-to-day basis with PNDA—the institution established by the Colombian government in 1995 to deal specifically with alternative development. As noted, USAID was required to focus its initial efforts on strengthening PNDA because the organization is institutionally weak. USAID officials said that PNDA may have difficulty effectively using the additional funding that it is projected to receive for alternative development projects.
While PNDA may have trouble absorbing this additional funding, the institution will have difficulty carrying out its responsibilities without it. Yet funding for important components of PNDA’s alternative development plans—from making infrastructure improvements to promoting licit crops and livestock—is not ensured. PNDA is supposed to provide immediate, short-term support to farmers cooperating in alternative development programs, bridging the gap between the signing of voluntary eradication agreements and receiving USAID assistance. Colombia developed these plans based on the expectation that it would receive about $300 million from European donors. However, little of that assistance has materialized to date. U.S. embassy officials told us that European donors are reluctant to participate in the program because, based on experiences in Bolivia and Peru, they associate it with the U.S.-supported forced eradication effort in Colombia.
The poor quality of the soil and infrastructure and the remoteness of project sites in coca-growing areas are further obstacles. Unlike the poppy-growing areas in northern Colombia—which have richer soils and better developed infrastructure and are closer to markets—much of the coca-growing areas in southern Colombia have soils that are poorly suited for licit crops and a lack of basic infrastructure. According to USAID officials, these problems are more severe in the coca-growing areas of Colombia than they were in counterpart areas of Bolivia and Peru. Even when suitable crops are identified, the distances involved make it difficult to transport produce for further processing or to potential markets. For instance, a palmito (heart of palm) canning plant that the United Nations Drug Control Program built in the Putumayo department in the mid-1990s sat dormant for a number of years because the farmers growing the palm were too far away to transport their produce to the plant before it spoiled. The plant recently opened for test runs after finding farmers closer to the plant to grow the palm.
Conclusions
Alternative development requires a long-term commitment and must be implemented with strong host-government support for sustained interdiction and eradication. The United States has provided alternative development assistance to Bolivia and Peru for nearly two decades, but little progress was made until the host government gained control of drug-growing areas and project sites, demonstrated a strong commitment to carry out effective interdiction and eradication policies, and carefully coordinated these efforts to achieve mutually reinforcing benefits.
While each of these components is important, none is more so than government control of the project areas. Experience in Bolivia and Peru strongly suggests that voluntary coca eradication in Colombia is not likely to achieve hoped for reductions in coca cultivation until, at a minimum, the Colombian government can provide the security in the coca-growing regions that is essential for carrying out sustained interdiction and eradication operations, providing safe access to alternative development project sites, and attracting the private investment needed for long-term income-generating development.
Considering the serious obstacles in Colombia that have impeded meaningful progress, USAID will have difficulty spending additional funds for alternative development over the next few years. Through fiscal year 2001, USAID has spent less than 11 percent of the $52.5 million available for alternative development in Colombia and does not plan to complete expenditure of these funds until at least fiscal year 2003. Nevertheless, USAID’s alternative development program documentation for Colombia still calls for dramatic reductions in coca cultivation in fiscal year 2002 through widespread voluntary eradication of coca crops by farm families who want to take advantage of alternative development assistance. Yet, few projects have been undertaken by USAID in the coca-growing regions.
Recommendation for Executive Action
Because USAID faces serious obstacles to achieving widespread voluntary coca eradication in Colombia, we recommend that the USAID administrator update USAID’s project plans and spending proposals for coca elimination in Colombia to take into account the extreme difficulty in gaining access to the coca-growing regions to ensure that funds are used as effectively as possible.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Because of the serious obstacles impeding alternative development in Colombia, the Congress should consider requiring that USAID demonstrate measurable progress in its current efforts to reduce coca cultivation in Colombia before any additional funding is provided for alternative development.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
USAID and State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see apps. III and IV, respectively). Both generally concurred with the report’s observations and conclusions.
USAID noted that the report was thorough and accurate and emphasized that alternative development can only be implemented in coordination with complementary eradication and interdiction programs. USAID also generally concurred with our recommendation to the administrator to update its alternative development plans for Colombia and noted that it has already begun such a review as part of its normal performance management process.
State said that the report was thoughtful and thorough and acknowledged the majority of our conclusions regarding the obstacles facing alternative development efforts in Colombia. State agreed with the report’s overall conclusion that careful coordination among alternative development, interdiction, and eradication programs is essential. It also provided further explanation of its aerial eradication program and the difficulties it has encountered in Colombia, including additional information about the accidental spraying of an alternative development project area. However, State said that it believes it is appropriate and constructive for the spraying of illicit coca to be conducted before alternative development programs are initiated in an area and suggested that the report implies a recommendation that aerial eradication and alternative development should not be conducted in the same location.
We do not agree with State that the report implies such a recommendation. In fact, we cite the need for coordinating alternative development with interdiction and eradication efforts as one of the chief requirements for success.
Scope and Methodology
To determine the lessons learned in providing alternative development assistance to Bolivia and Peru, we interviewed cognizant officials and analyzed program documentation. Specifically,
• In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials in USAID’s Office of South American Affairs and State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. We also met with officials at the two major USAID contractors that provided alternative development services in Bolivia and Peru—Development Alternatives, Inc., and Winrock International, Inc. In addition, we reviewed USAID project design and evaluation documents, contractor performance reports, and program audits. From our analysis, we determined key goals and accomplishments for the alternative development programs in Bolivia and Peru.
• In Bolivia and Peru, we interviewed USAID mission, U.S. embassy, host-government, and nongovernmental organization officials. We also made site visits to selected project sites and met with project beneficiaries in both countries. From our analysis, we identified critical elements that facilitated or impeded the alternative development efforts in these countries. To determine the current status of USAID’s alternative development efforts in Colombia and the challenges faced there, we interviewed cognizant officials and reviewed program planning and financial documents. Specifically,
• In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials in USAID’s Office of South American Affairs and State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and analyzed USAID program plans and expenditure data to determine the progress of USAID’s efforts in Colombia.
• In Colombia, we interviewed USAID mission, U.S. embassy, United Nations Drug Control Program, and host-government officials, including the senior officers of PNDA—the Colombian alternative development institution. We also met with officials at Chemonics International, Inc.— the major USAID contractor for alternative development services in Colombia. In addition, we analyzed USAID, PNDA, and Chemonics project design documents and status reports. We compared the factors that impeded or facilitated alternative development in Bolivia and Peru with Colombia’s situation to identify the critical challenges faced there. We performed our work from January through December 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the secretary of state, and the administrator of USAID. Copies also will be made available to other interested parties upon request.
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call me at (202) 512-4268. An additional GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Jess T. Ford,
Director International Affairs and Trade
References
1 Alternative development entails a broad range of development initiatives to generate legal employment alternatives, alleviate poverty, and spur investment and economic growth. Such efforts often involve substituting licit crops for illicit ones. However, they may also entail creating other employment opportunities, such as those provided by various types of agro-industry. Complementary measures may include improving infrastructure, providing social services, strengthening local governments, offering access to credit, and giving marketing and distribution assistance.
2 The leaves of the coca plant are used to produce cocaine.
3 Colombia has pledged to provide $4 billion to support the plan and called on the international community, including the United States, to provide the remaining $3.5 billion.
4 Title III, chapter 2, of the Emergency Supplemental Act, fiscal year 2000, as enacted in the Military Construction Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-246, 114 Stat. 571).
5 Title II of the fiscal year 2002 Foreign Operations appropriation bill (P.L. 107-115).
6 According to the Department of State, between 1996 and 2000, the net hectares (2.47 acres) under coca cultivation in Colombia increased by 69,000—from 67,200 hectares in 1996 to 136,200 hectares in 2000—while the number of hectares under coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru declined by 93,700—from 142,500 to 48,800—over the same period.
7 Since 1997, USAID has financed its alternative development programs—including those in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru—with funds transferred from State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. USAID previously funded its alternative development programs from its own agency budget for economic support.
8 We have reported on the importance of host country support in interdicting and eradicating illicit drugs and in exerting government control over narcotics-producing regions. See Drug Policy and Agriculture: U.S. Trade Impacts of Alternative Crops to Andean Coca (GAO/NSIAD-92-12, Oct. 28, 1991); Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Colombia and Bolivia (GAO/NSIAD-89-24, Nov. 1, 1988); Drug Control: U.S. International Narcotics Control Activities (GAO/NSIAD-88-114, Mar. 1, 1988); and Drug Control: International Narcotics Control Activities of the United States (GAO/NSIAD-87-72BR, Jan. 30, 1987).
9 PNDA is the Colombian government’s acronym for Plan Nacional De Desarrollo Alternativo or the National Plan for Alternative Development. It is also referred to as PLANTE.
10 Prior alternative development projects in Colombia were primarily in the poppy-growing areas and administered in part by the United Nations Drug Control Program.
11 USAID reported in August 2001 that a cumulative total of 680 hectares of poppy had been eliminated.
12 $11.2 million was set aside for USAID’s operating expenses.
13 USAID/Colombia Quarterly Report, Aug. 22, 2001.
14 USAID/Colombia Alternative Development Design Document, November 2000.
15 In 1998, in an effort to promote peace negotiations, the Colombian government granted a 16,200 square mile haven in southern Colombia to the largest insurgency group in the country—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
16 The fiscal year 2002 Foreign Operations appropriation bill prohibits the use of funds to procure chemicals for aerial fumigation programs after 6 months from the date of the enactment of the act, unless alternative development programs have been developed in the departments in which aerial coca fumigation is planned and alternative development programs are in place in the departments in which aerial coca fumigation is being conducted. The bill also requires the secretary of state, after consultation with the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the secretary of the Department of Agriculture, and the director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, if appropriate, to make determinations and report to the Congress on various aspects of the aerial fumigation program, including the safety of the chemicals used in aerial fumigation operations.
source: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02291.pdf 25feb02 (note: URL will most likely be changed by GAO)
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