Nuclear Plant Lapses Could Have Caused Explosion, Investigators Say
[CNN article & Pantex facts below]
WASHINGTON—Workers dismantling an aging nuclear weapon improperly secured broken pieces of a highly explosive component by taping them together, federal investigators found. An explosion could have occurred, they said.
The incident was among several recent safety lapses at the Energy Department's Pantex plant near Amarillo, Texas, noted by the independent Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Last fall, workers taking apart another old warhead accidentally drilled into the warhead's radioactive core, forcing evacuation of the facility.
This month's unorthodox handling of the unstable explosive increased the risk that the technicians would drop it and set off a "violent reaction," the safety board said Tuesday in a letter to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham.
Such a reaction could have "potentially unacceptable consequences," board chairman John T. Conway said in the letter, which raised disquieting questions about safety at the Pantex plant.
About 250,000 people live within 50 miles of the Pantex plant, where the motto on its Web site is "Maintaining the safety, security and reliability of America's nuclear weapons stockpile."
Nothing exploded, and no one was hurt.
The National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the Energy Department's nuclear weapons programs, is investigating, spokesman Bryan Wilkes said Friday.
"Safety remains a priority for us," Wilkes said. "We are working to address the issues in the letter."
Safety board chairman Conway's letter did not make clear whether the explosive had been separated at the time from the softball-sized chunk of plutonium that forms the pit, or trigger, of a thermonuclear warhead. To prevent a thermonuclear blast, the pit would have to have been separated from the larger warhead.
If the explosive were still connected to the trigger, an explosion could have injured or killed workers and could have spread plutonium or other radioactive materials around the facility.
The taping and removal of the explosive did not go as planned, and only quick thinking by the technicians prevented them from dropping the explosive, Conway wrote.
Conway said taping the explosives together was one of several mistakes made by Pantex officials that risked an explosion. Pantex officials also played down the risk, Conway said, calling the cracks in the explosive and the fact that workers taped it together a trivial change in procedures.
Jud Simmons, a spokesman for Pantex plant operator BWX Technologies Inc., did not return telephone messages on Friday.
The pit's plutonium is surrounded by an explosive shell. When the explosives detonate, the plutonium is compressed and causes a nuclear explosion. In a thermonuclear weapon, that explosion sets off an even stronger nuclear blast.
Workers dismantling the pit in question found the explosive was cracked, which made it more unstable and easier to detonate, Conway wrote. Their solution was to tape together the cracked explosives and move them to another location.
In his letter, Conway said other problems included:
Conway's letter does not elaborate on what might have happened had the explosive detonated.
The Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has an inspector stationed at the Pantex plant and at the nation's other nuclear weapons sites. Weekly reports by the Pantex inspector, William White, show several problems with safety at the plant, including flaws in the software designed to control the movement of nuclear and explosive materials around the site.
White reported in October that Pantex technicians had made a mistake while dismantling a W62 warhead from a Minuteman missile. A drill damaged part of the warhead's nuclear core, prompting officials to evacuate the facility until experts determined that no radiation had leaked, White wrote.
source: http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040124/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/nuclear_weapon_tape_7 25jan04
WASHINGTON—Workers at a nuclear weapons plant in Texas improperly secured broken pieces of a highly explosive component by taping them together, which could have caused a "violent reaction," federal investigators report.
No one was hurt, the facility was not damaged and safe control of all components and materials was maintained during the incident January 8, according to news release from the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas.
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board investigated that incident, as well as several previous safety lapses at the Pantex Plant, the nation's sole nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility.
The workers were taking apart an aging nuclear weapon when they taped the broken pieces together.
In a separate incident in October, workers taking apart a W62 warhead accidentally drilled into its radioactive core. The facility was evacuated, and experts later found that no radiation had leaked from the warhead.
Safety board Chairman John Conway wrote a letter to Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham this week to summarize the board's findings regarding the January 8 incident.
Among them were:
According to Conway's letter, posted on the safety board's Web site, "potentially unacceptable consequences" could have ensued. The letter did not specify what might have happened had an explosion or detonation occurred.
In a written statement, Pantex acknowledged the incident and said it has halted work on the weapons system. A review of the incident will address the issues raised by the board, and a report will be sent to the Department of Energy.
The Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board could not be reached for comment.
source: http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/Southwest/01/24/nuclear.plant 25jan04
PANTEX FACTS
Date Established: 1951
Size: Approximately 10,000 acres controlled by DOE and approximately 5,900 acres leased as a security buffer
Employees: Approximately 3,800 maintenance and operation contractor personnel and DOE personnel (as of October 1996).
Annual Budget: $290 million for fiscal year 1997, and $308 million for fiscal year 1998.
Cognizant Secretarial Officers: Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP) and Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM).
Responsible Operations/Area Office: DOE Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) and Amarillo Area Office (AAO).
Management and Operating Contractor: Mason & Hanger Corporation (M&H).
Subcontractors: Battelle Memorial Institute; Sandia National Laboratories.
Present Mission:
Pantex Plant's primary mission is to:
Assemble nuclear weapons for the nation's stockpile Disassemble nuclear weapons being retired from the stockpile Evaluate, repair, and retrofit nuclear weapons in the stockpile Demilitarize and sanitize components from dismantled nuclear weapons Provide interim storage for plutonium pits from dismantled nuclear weapons Develop, fabricate, and test chemical explosives and explosive components for nuclear weapons and to support Department of Energy (DOE) initiatives. Fissile Material: Total quantity of plutonium is 66.1 metric tons, including Department of Defense quantities (February 6, 1996).
Pantex Plant was originally constructed as a conventional bomb plant for the U.S. Army during the early days of World War II. As were many war-era munitions plants, Pantex was deactivated after the war ended. It remained vacant until 1949, when Texas Technological College in Lubbock (now Texas Tech University) purchased the 16,000-acre site for $ 1. Texas Tech used the land for experimental cattle-feeding operations.
In 1951, at the request of the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Department of Energy), the Army exercised a recapture clause in the sale contract and reclaimed the main plant and 10,000 surrounding acres for use as a nuclear weapons production facility.
Mason & Hanger Corp., was awarded a $25 million contract to refurbish and expand the plant. (Today's replacement cost of this government-owned, contractor operated facility -- including buildings, equipment, and real estate -- is estimated at more than $3 billion.)
Procter & Gamble was awarded the first five-year management and operating contract in 1951, but it declined to renew the contract. The contract was then awarded to Mason & Hanger, which has operated and managed Pantex since October 1, 1956.
The Amarillo Area Office of the DOE was established in 1965, the year that the Clarksville, Tennessee, modification facility was closed. A year later, the Medina, Texas, modification facility closed. And in 1975, the nuclear weapons operations at Pantex's sister plant at Burlington, Iowa, were transferred to Pantex.
The consolidation of these operations leaves Pantex as the only plant in the United States where nuclear weapons are assembled and disassembled.
In 1989, the remaining 6,000 acres of the original site were leased from Texas Tech. This irrigated farmland now serves as a safety and security buffer south and west of the Plant.
Also in 1989, the DOE Rocky Flats Plant, located in Golden, Colorado, was deactivated as a plutonium processing center due to environmental concerns, urban encroachment, and protest by activist groups. The deactivation of Rocky Flats necessitated the interim storage of plutonium pits. Since no other DOE facility has the necessary storage, interim storage of the plutonium pits was proposed for Pantex. The Environmental Assessment (EA) was written for the interim storage that resulted in a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). This means that the proposed action will not cause significant impacts to the surrounding environment if implemented.
In the 1990s, the easing of political tensions marked a new era in international relations. The United States and the former Soviet Union are now working to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles, and Pantex plays a vital part in this operation. During this reduction effort, DOE continues to meet its commitment to safely disassemble and dispose of weapons returned from the Department of Defense.
Disassembly and disposition operations at Pantex are conducted under the highest possible levels of safety and security. Protecting the environment and safeguarding human safety and health are of paramount importance to the people at Pantex, and the Plant's management is committed to a policy of openness regarding these issues.
Nuclear weapons disassembly is a technically precise process. Each part that is removed from a disassembled weapon receives a careful security and environmental screening before being disposed of. Weapons parts containing nuclear materials come to Pantex as encapsulated components.
Population
As of January 1, 1995, approximately 3,530 people were employed at the Pantex Plant. This number is comprised of approximately 3,310 Mason & Hanger and Battelle employees, 75 Department of Energy (DOE) Amarillo Area Office employees, 130 DOE Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) employees, and 15 Sandia National Laboratory employees. There are approximately 250 additional people officed on Plant associated with consultants, subcontractors, and oversight agencies.
Land and Facilities
The Pantex Plant site is located on land owned and leased by the DOE. DOE owns approximately 10,177 acres, including Pantex Lake, with approximately 660 buildings containing approximately 2,900,000 gross feet. This includes roughly 64,000 gross feet under construction. Farm-to-Market roads border Pantex to the north, east, and west. Critical plant operations near the southern boundary require DOE to lease approximately 5,900 acres of land between the Plant and U.S. Highway 60. The land, leased from Texas Tech University, provides increased safety and security buffers. Land not actively used for Pantex operations is managed by Texas Tech Agriculture Research operations for farming and grazing activities.
Building Facilities Categories
Production - The production category represents 33 percent of the site's square footage with approximately 965,000 gross feet. The production category includes assembly/disassembly and applied technology buildings. The buildings in the production category vary from modern facilities designed to meet modern safety criteria, to World War II vintage structures.
Storage - The storage category accounts for 24 percent, or approximately 695,000 gross feet of the site's square footage. The storage category represents buildings varying from portable waste storage buildings to weapons and nuclear material staging magazines.
Administrative - The administrative category accounts for 30 percent, or approximately 870,000 gross square feet, of the site's square footage. This category includes office buildings, medical facilities, cafeterias, and training facilities.
Support - The support category consists of 13 percent, or approximately 370,000 gross square feet, of the site's total square footage. Connecting ramps and security facilities are included in this category.
Budget Pantex's operating budget comes from three primary funding resources:
Core Stockpile Management (CAM) Environmental Management Reimbursable costs. Reimbursable costs are typically funded through either the Department of Defense or the National Laboratories.
Actual CAM costs for fiscal year (FY)1994 were $214 million. The FY1995 CAM operating budget is $230 million. Environmental Management and reimbursable costs for FY1994 totalled $38 million, and the FY1995 budget for these funding sources is also $38 million.
The future mission of Pantex is dependent on the final outcome or Record of Decision (ROD) of several Environmental Impact Statements (EIS). Each EIS deals with a separate issue, but all have a bearing on the future of Pantex.
The DOE has assigned all current dismantlement activities to the Pantex Plant. This means Pantex will dismantle weapons on a schedule of up to 2,000 per year until the stockpile has decreased to the predetermined number. It is estimated that dismantlement should be completed by 2004.
EIS's affecting the future of Pantex:
Pantex Site-Wide EIS Environmental Management PEIS Tritium Supply and Recycle PEIS Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials PEIS Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Environmental Assessment Population Assuming the mission at Pantex does not change appreciably, indications are that the Plant's workforce will decrease gradually through FY2004. Issues that may affect the site population include the outcome of several PEISs, the planned decrease in the disassembly and disposal workload, and the reduced funding that is needed to support Environmental Restoration/Waste Management requirements. Current assumptions are that the Management and Operations contractor personnel at Pantex will range from 3,500 to fewer than 2,500 personnel. This number will vary relative to the mission and workload levels of the Plant.
Budget
Pantex operating budget projections for FY1996 and FY1997 is $240 million and $248 million respectively. The Environmental Management and reimbursable costs for FY1996 and FY1997 decrease to $31 million for both years. The Environmental Management budget is anticipated to decrease significantly beyond FY1997, resulting in a substantial reduction of Waste Management activities.
Planned Production Workload
Production Rates (Units/Yr) Activity 2-3 yrs 10 yrs Disassembly or Disposal 2,000 150 Stockpile Evaluation 120 120 Retrofit/Conversion 200 190
The workload chart shows plans for the next two to three years and at 10 years. As shown, the workload is decreasing significantly. The production rates include disassembly, demilitarization, sanitization, recycling, reuse, and reclamation.
Plutonium Resource Center
Amarillo National Resource Center for Plutonium (ANRCP) will be a scientific and technical resource for information related to the storage, disposition, potential use, and transportation of plutonium, high explosives, and other material generated from nuclear weapons dismantlement.
Projected functions of ANRCP include:
Providing information about the interpretation of technical and scientific data identified by interest groups and concerned citizens, elected officials, and site-specific advisory groups. Participating in studies of international verification controls of fissile materials. Evaluating options for plutonium disposition. Engaging in bilateral exchanges between Russia and the U.S. Initial efforts proposed by the ANRCP include:
Developing a comprehensive electronic archive of nuclear material. Exploring beneficial reuse of high explosives. Establishing a public outreach program. Facilitating agreements in the U.S. and the Russian Summit Working Group on Disposition and Accumulation of Fissile Materials. Also coordinated through the ANRCP is a joint DOE/State of Texas Agreement in Principle and Grant providing support for environmental inventory and assessment and emergency preparedness planning with respect to Pantex Plant.
Pantex Organizations
Department of Energy (DOE)
The Amarillo Area Office of the Department of Energy (AAO/DOE) is the onsite DOE presence responsible for directing Plant operations. DOE's Amarillo Area Office (AAO) is one of six area offices under jurisdiction of the Albuquerque Operations Office. Activated as a Branch Office in 1951, and upgraded to an Area Office in 1965, the office now has 78 employees and an annual payroll of more than $4 million. The AAO is responsible for the successful accomplishment of DOE missions assigned to the Plant; provides program management; and is accountable for critical functional areas that could affect the security, health, safety, and welfare of the general public. The AAO also administers the DOE management operating contract with Mason & Hanger under a Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) arrangement. This responsibility includes contract interpretation, direction, guidance, monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the operating contractor's performance for award fee purposes.
Mason & Hanger - A subsidiary of Day & Zimmermann, Inc.,
Mason & Hanger, the prime DOE contractor for the operation of Pantex, was established in 1827 and is the second oldest engineering and construction firm in the United States. Until World War II, the company specialized in major construction projects including the Grand Coulee Dam, the Lincoln Tunnel, and the Carquinez Strait Bridge. At Pantex, where it employs 2,950 workers, Mason & Hanger is responsible for the assembly, disassembly, repair, and retirement of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as the development and production of high explosive components for these weapons. The successes at Pantex--in fields as diverse as blast-resistant structures, particle analysis and characterization, microwave motion detectors, ultra-speed testing, and other special security considerations--have found applications in many other areas. The single largest success at Pantex is the impressive safety record during its many years of operation.
Sandia National Laboratories
The Sandia Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory (WETL) has been an important part of Pantex since 1966. There are about 17 highly trained technicians assigned to the Sandia Department. The mission of the WETL is to support the timely detection of defects in the nuclear weapons stockpile by evaluating weapon subsystems in the laboratory. All weapons evaluation is performed in accordance with predefined test plans. These plans include gathering data from the performance of electrical tests on both stockpiled and newly produced weapons. The Sandia Laboratory and Pantex Plant houses more than $75 million worth of sophisticated electronic test equipment, computerized data-gathering and data-processing systems, and environmental-simulation equipment. Included are unique testers for each weapon system, centrifuges, temperature-conditioning equipment, spinners, and waveform-analysis systems.
DOE Courier Section
Weapons are transported to and from Pantex in specially equipped trucks operated by DOE's Transportation Safeguards Division. These heavily armored trucks and trailers are driven by armed couriers who are DOE employees with the authority to use deadly force while protecting a weapons shipment. Each convoy includes escort vehicles driven by additional couriers. Special communication equipment enables a control center to track the exact location of each convoy as it rolls toward Pantex. The Pantex Courier Section has more than 100 employees.
The Pantex Plant is a Government-owned nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly facility that also manufactures High Explosive (HE) components. The facility is located near Amarillo, Texas, on approximately 9,100 acres at Pantex Plant proper and 1,077 acres of detached property called Pantex Lake, approximately 2.5 miles northeast of the main plant site. An additional 5,800 acres of land south of the main Plant area is leased from Texas Tech University for use as a safety and security buffer zone.
The facilities on site consist of 730 buildings on approximately 3,010,0000 gross square feet (gsf). Plant facilities can be divided into several broad categories: production/laboratory (90 Buildings and 915,000 gsf), storage (235 Buildings, 680,000 gsf), administrative (160 Buildings, 715,000 gsf), support (230 Buildings, 635,000 gsf), and safe shutdown (15 Buildings, 65,000 gsf). As of October 1, 1999, the Pantex Plant employment level was approximately 2,800 people in various disciplines.
The Pantex Plant is one of several production plants that are critical to the Department of Energy's (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship Program. For most of its history and continuing today, the primary missions of the Pantex Plant are the assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons and the manufacture of HE components.
With the end of the Cold War, DOE has made major programmatic decisions that affect the current and future operation of the Pantex Plant. Presidential decisions and international treaties have required the Pantex Plant to dismantle a significant fraction of the Cold War nuclear weapons stockpile during the decade of the 1990's. Most significant for the future, DOE determined in the 1996 Record of Decision for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement that the Pantex Plant would be the sole U.S. site for the maintenance, refurbishment, and eventual dismantlement of the future (smaller) U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile.
The Department of Energy's Pantex Plant is currently in the process of decontaminating structures no longer needed to support its new mission. These structures may include production, administrative or testing facilities. Decommissioning of production and test facilities has the complication of the possibility of mixed – hazardous and radioactive – contamination. Pantex desires to reduce the radioactive decontamination levels of such facilities to de minimis levels, which allows for a much larger number of disposal or recycling options. Further, Pantex personnel wish to promote and use more environmentally benign decontamination methods whenever possible. This led to testing of two competing technologies for decontamination of surfaces — Steel Grit Blasting and Crushed Safety Glass Blasting. The glass media blasting technology was far superior to the steel grit blast technology from an environmental standpoint. The assessment showed an almost across the board factor of 5.7 times less environmental burdens for the glass media blasting compared to the same criteria for steel grit blasting.
In performing its mission the facility must closely interact with other production plants and design laboratories in the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC), other DOE Offices (such as Headquarters (HQ) and Operations Offices) and numerous other organizations including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the State of Texas. The Pantex Plant is operated under the direction of the DOE Amarillo Area Office.
The challenges facing the facility are to have a balanced nuclear weapons complex workload, a modern integrated complex with unique and interdependent facilities, an operationally-ready state-of-the-art production capability (efficient, agile, responsive, streamlined), and a stimulating work environment to attract and retain a workforce with the required technical skills and capabilities.
The land surface of the area surrounding the Pantex Plant site is relatively flat with a gentle, regional slope of about 1.5 to 1.9 m/Km (8 to 10 ft/mi) to the southeast. Maximum and minimum (excluding playa floors) elevations at the site are about 1,103 and 1,109 m (3,585 and 3,530 ft) at the northwest and southeast corners, respectively. The most notable feature of the topography is the presence of numerous playa basins ranging up to about 4.02 km (2.5 mi) in diameter with floors as much as 10 m (30 ft) below the general land surface. Within the playa basins, slopes range up to about five percent. Playas are significant because of their role in collecting surface water and, in some cases, concentrating infiltration to recharge the aquifers. These landforms are the result of a series of intermittently active processes, including wind, fluvial erosion and lacustrine deposition, dissolution of soil carbonate, salt dissolution and subsidence, and animal activities, that collectively produced these typically shallow and roughly circular basins on the High Plains. More than 20,000 playas are present on the High Plains of Texas and New Mexico High Plains and are a contributing source of groundwater recharge for the High Plains aquifer.
The Pantex Plant was first used by the U.S. Army for production of conventional ordnance from 1942 to 1945. In 1951, the Atomic Energy Commission chose the site for expansion of its nuclear weapons assembly facilities, and the Army Ordnance Corps contracted with Silas Mason Company to begin rehabilitating portions of the original Plant and constructing new facilities. Since then, DOE and its predecessor agencies have been responsible for operation of the Pantex Plant.
The Plant missions are the fabrication of chemical explosives for nuclear weapons, assembly of nuclear weapons for the nation's stockpile, maintenance and evaluation of nuclear weapons in the stockpile, disassembly of nuclear weapons being retired from the stockpile, demilitarization and sanitization of weapon components from dismantlement activities, and interim storage of plutonium components from retired weapons. Weapons assembly, disassembly, and stockpile surveillance activities involve short-term handling (but not processing) of uranium, plutonium, and tritium, as well as a variety of non-radioactive hazardous or toxic chemicals.
Pantex is composed of several functional areas, commonly referred to as numbered zones. These zones include a weapons assembly/disassembly area (Zone 12), a weapons staging area (Zone 4), an area for experimental explosive development (Zone 11), a drinking water treatment plant (Zone 15), a sanitary waste water treatment facility (Zone 13), and vehicle maintenance and administrative areas (Zone 16). Other functional areas include an explosive test- firing facility, a burning ground for explosive materials, and an area of landfills north of Zone 10; Zone 10 is currently used only for storage.
Pantex Plant is a government-owned, contractor-operated facility managed by the DOE Amarillo Area Office (AAO). Mason and Hanger Corporation (M&H) has been the operating contractor since 1956. Battelle Memorial Institute provides environment, safety, and health (ES&H) support to M&H under a subcontract.
Approximately 3,800 people are employed at the Pantex Plant. This number includes M&H, Battelle Memorial Institute, DOE Transportation Safeguards Division, AAO, Army Corps of Engineers, and Sandia National Laboratories personnel. There are also approximately 250 personnel located on site associated with consultants, outside contractors, and oversight agencies.
The lead cognizant secretarial officer is the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP). The Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for environmental restoration and waste management activities at Pantex.
The contract with M&H, which began in 1956 and was last awarded in 1996, was extended for three years through September 30, 1999. Since 1991, ES&H programs have been subcontracted to Battelle Memorial Institute and this relationship continues. This contract is a cost plus award fee performance-based contract that incorporates DOE contract reform initiatives, with about 84 percent of the contract fee based on delivery objective results.
The environmental impact associated with potential, projected mission changes, and the risk presented by the proximity of air traffic patterns to Pantex Plant areas continue to hold the interest of the local community and management.
Continuing allegations concerning safety violations, retribution against whistleblowers, an unsafe safety culture, cost accounting, and questionable contractor expenditures, along with resolution of the future mission of the Pantex Plant (including workforce restructuring), continue to hold the attention of many stakeholder groups and members of congress. A Government Accounting Office (GAO) investigation associated with the allegations of danger and deceit by the contractor is due to be published in December 1996, and the GAO is pursuing audits of workforce restructuring at other sites based on Pantex Plant experience.
Almost all plutonium at the Pantex Plant is weapons grade and in the form of pits, the plutonium assemblies that serve as a primary nuclear component of a weapon. A pit consists of a plutonium metal shell surrounded by a hermetically sealed outer metal shell that is usually stainless steel. For interim storage, pits are packaged in AL-R8 storage containers. The total quantity of plutonium at Pantex is large. In July 1994, Pantex had over 6,000 pits and sealed sources.
A significant vulnerability at Pantex Plant is total reliance on the outer metal shell of a pit as the only barrier to prevent plutonium oxidation and release. The pits have not been tested and qualified for extended storage, which begins after the service life of a weapon. Some pits have weaknesses in joint materials and design, making them vulnerable to failure and consequent plutonium release during handling and storage.
The oldest pits at the Pantex Plant are over 33 years old. Aging and environmental effects may cause or contribute to a wide variety of pit failures. Daily warming and nightly cooling of pit storage magazines may lead to crack initiation and growth in aluminum welds in some pits. Chemical contaminants introduced during testing, cleaning, and packaging may also initiate crack growth over extended periods of time.
Almost all pits are stored in magazines in AL- R8 containers. Being unsealed, the AL-R8 containers do not keep out airborne contaminants and would not completely contain plutonium released from a failed pit.
The Pantex Plant surveillance program uses relatively simple methods to identify failed pits but does not address underlying failure mechanisms or their causes. Normal Pantex Plant operations involve only sealed forms of plutonium. Any incident exposing plutonium at the Pantex Plant would be handled as an abnormal event by trained personnel.
Explosive Disposal
The Burning Grounds (BG-3 and BG-4) are used to thermally dispose of high explosives, and Building 12-73 is used to clean and decontaminate tooling exposed to high explosives. These facilities are between 22 and 42 years old. Building 12-73 totals approximately 1,900 square feet; the Burning Grounds are approximately one square mile in size. The Burning Grounds consist of a number of pads for open air burning, supported by small material storage areas. As dismantlement continues, the need for the burning grounds to dispose of waste high explosives will also continue; eventually the need for burning of high explosives will be eliminated.
Onsite Transportation and Loading Docks
The facilities for transporting nuclear explosives, weapons components, and other process-related material consist of Loading Dock 4-26 located in the western part of Zone 4 and Loading Docks 12-98 and 12-99 in the production part of Zone 12. Operations include movement of weapons or components in safe-secure trailers or in hardened trailers between Zone 4 and Zone 12 or on forklift or handcart between buildings, and loading/unloading and packing/unpacking operations. The loading docks and transportation activities are associated with movement of nuclear weapons and weapon components.
source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/pantex.htm 25jan04
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