The United States Congress is edging closer to repealing a ban against developing smaller, more usable nuclear warheads. Such a move looks more like "business-as-usual" when viewed purely in the context of US national security. But for the world at large, this development - though it is ominous - should not be too surprising.
Graphic by Asia Times
The Bush administration has made several public announcements regarding its perspectives on the use of nuclear weapons. It was clear from the beginning that it would consider using nuclear weapons "first against an attacker, or even potential attacker, whether a state or non-state player, whether armed with nuclear weapons or not". In his National Security Strategy, President George W Bush unambiguously stated that America would strike first against its enemies who are seeking weapons of mass destruction. The nuclear posture review stressed "the possible use of nuclear weapons to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets as chemical or biological weapons, storehouses, or factories, or underground command centers". Then his administration decided not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty , abandoned the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and unilaterally opted to develop national missile defense systems.
Cumulatively, these developments created a feeling that the US was determined to establish its nuclear hegemony, a perception that is virtually guaranteed to trigger a new nuclear arms race involving China and Russia. India and Pakistan - the newest nuclear powers - have not deescalated the pace of their own nuclear arms race since 1998, when they brought their nuclear programs out of the closet. But their competition has little to do with the nuclear policies of Bush.
Here are two points of utmost concern. First, in the pre-September 11, 2001, years, the US largely relied on a plethora of nonproliferation regimes to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its nonproliferation techniques also included imposition of stringent economic sanctions, which had telling effects only on countries like Pakistan, which substantially depended on the US for military and economic assistance. But a country like India that could purchase weapons from Russia and other Western sources did not suffer much as a result of those sanctions. In the final analysis, however, even a country like Pakistan decided to develop nuclear weapons, no matter the cost. The seeming lack of potency of nonproliferation measures had already persuaded president Bill Clinton to consider relying on counter-proliferation measures.
However, in the post-September 11 strategic environment, the US readily opted to develop stout counter-proliferation policies and armed them with the threat of preemptive attacks, especially when there were reports that the terrorist group, al-Qaeda, might have acquired "dirty bombs". Bush's "axis of evil" speech of January 2002 clearly identified North Korea, Iran and Iraq as potential targets of counter-proliferation policy and the doctrine of preemption. After the US invasion of Iraq - especially since one of the arguments used was to disarm Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction capabilities - the US counter-proliferation policy was no longer viewed as empty saber rattling, either by North Korea or Iran.
Second, while Washington appears determined to unravel the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea, and dissuade Iran from continuing its own nuclear program, this newest wrinkle of the US nuclear weapons policy - i.e., of developing tactical nukes - is likely to convince both those nations that they had better continue with their respective nuclear options. After all, Washington still regards them as part of the "axis of evil"; thus they are fully qualified to be targets, not only of preemption, but also of regime change.
The rationale underlying the Bush administration's preference for developing tactical nuclear weapons is that, despite possessing awesome military power, it envisions the world as "dangerous" and full of new threats that necessitate acquisition of "a new generation of low yield weapons for pinpoint strikes, largely against deeply buried caches of weapons of mass destruction".
So, the international system faces two separate arguments about nuclear proliferation that promise to enhance the significance of nuclear weapons and even increase the prospects of further proliferation of such weapons, the US related-related threats notwithstanding. From the US side, it is being argued that tactical nuclear weapons ought to be developed as a response against rogue nations and future proliferators of chemical and nuclear weapons. The potential of increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons might have made the present arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons less relevant. But no one is arguing that a drastic reduction in the size of that arsenal should be negotiated by the US and Russia. Thus the nuclear primacy of the US will be further enhanced.
The second argument from the so-called "axis of evil" nations is that they must have nuclear weapons of their own because that might be the only way they will be able to deter a US attack. But while they are developing those weapons, they are exposing themselves to a potential US strike under the doctrines of preemption and counter-proliferation. North Korea might have saved itself by already developing nuclear weapons. However, the jury is still out on that account.
For Iran, however, it is a significantly different story. It has made substantial progress in its nuclear program, but has not been able to develop even one nuclear weapon. Now the heat is being turned up on the ayatollahs by Washington. Their choice is rather stark: abandon the nuclear program or it will be destroyed. The Iraqi bases will come in handy for the US to lower the boom on Iran.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/EF11Aa02.html 10jun03
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